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Abstract in English 
The European electricity and gas markets have been going through a process of liberalisation 
since the early 1990s. This process has changed the sector from a regulated structure of, 
predominantly, publicly owned monopolists controlling the entire supply chain, into a market 
where private and public generators and retailers compete on a regulated and unbundled system 
of transport infrastructure. This report assesses the evidence of the effects of liberalisation on 
efficiency, security of energy supply and environmental sustainability. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Het liberaliseringsproces in de Europese elektriciteits- en gasmarkten is begonnen in de jaren 
negentig. Door dit proces veranderde de structuur van de sector, die voorheen gedomineerd 
werd door gereguleerde staatsmonopolisten die in de hele energieketen actief waren, in een 
marktstructuur waarin private en publieke producenten en leveranciers met elkaar concurreren 
op een gereguleerd en ontvlecht transportnetwerk. Dit rapport geeft een overzicht van de 
literatuur over de effecten van liberalisering op de efficiëntie, leveringszekerheid en 
duurzaamheid van de energiesector.  
 
Steekwoorden: Liberalisering, energie, efficiëntie, leveringszekerheid, duurzaamheid 
 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.  
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Preface 
The liberalisation process has changed the structure and relationships in the energy industry, 
introducing new policy challenges. Given the importance of the energy sector for economic 
growth, reforms in the electricity and gas industry remain high on the European policy agenda. 
This study analyses the effects of liberalisation on efficiency, security of supply and 
environmental sustainability. Insights from the economic literature help us to establish the 
major effects of liberalisation and to highlight the policy challenges and options.  
 
The study is an extended version of the document underlying the energy chapter of the 
Competitiveness Report 2006, recently published by the European Commission. The project has 
been commissioned and financed by the European Commission. Given the broad scope of the 
project and the complexity of the issues analysed, it has been done in collaboration with the 
German Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW (Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim, Germany), which provided the opportunity of making the 
best use of the expertise of both collaborating parties. CPB focused on the effects of 
liberalisation on efficiency and security of supply, while ZEW analysed the environmental 
effects.  
 
Within the project team, Machiel Mulder was project leader. He also wrote the introductory 
chapter and part of the chapter on efficiency, and did the final editing of this report. Victoria 
Shestalova wrote the chapter on the cross-country comparison and the rest of the efficiency 
chapter. Gijsbert Zwart wrote the chapter on security of energy supply. Astrid Dannenberg, Tim 
Mennel and Ulf Moslener from ZEW, contributed the chapter on environmental effects.  
 
The researchers benefited from comments by the steering group of DG Enterprise and Industry 
of the European Commission. The authors are grateful to Erik Canton, Dominique Simonis, 
Isabel Grilo, and George Lemonidis from DG Enterprise and Industry for many discussions, 
their constructive comments and their efforts in discussing drafts of this document with their 
colleagues, which provided additional feedback on this work. We are also grateful to William 
Webster and Vicenc Pedret Cusco from DG TREN for their comments. The responsibility for 
this publication rests entirely on the CPB and ZEW. 
 
The project team would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of CPB-colleagues Casper 
van Ewijk, Marc Lijesen and Paul Veenendaal. Jeannette Verbruggen did technical editing of 
the report, fitting it into the CPB standard lay-out.  
 
Coen Teulings  
Director 
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Summary 
The European electricity and gas markets have been going through a process of liberalisation 
since the early 1990s. This process has changed the sector from a regulated structure of, 
predominantly, publicly owned monopolists controlling the entire supply chain, into a market 
where private and public generators and retailers compete on a regulated and unbundled system 
of transport infrastructure. In this report we assess the evidence of the effects of liberalisation 
on efficiency, security of energy supply and environmental sustainability. 
 
Based on the overview of selected indicators of market development, we conclude that there are 
substantial differences among the EU Member countries in the state of the liberalisation of their 
energy industries. On average, the reforms began earlier and have advanced more in the 
electricity industry than in the gas industry. Although many essential steps have already been 
taken since the beginning of the reforms of the energy sector, the creation of well-functioning 
competitive energy markets still faces many challenges.  
 
The change of incentives, resulting either from the introduction of competition or from more 
stringent regulation, has generally resulted in more cost-efficient operation. Although the 
reduced costs have to some extent been passed on to consumers, market behaviour raises 
concerns. Wholesale markets have turned out to be particularly vulnerable to market power, as a 
consequence of both legacy industry structure and the specific characteristics of electricity and 
gas. In the retail segment for domestic customers, the viability of competition, which relies on 
the willingness of consumers to switch, is yet to be proved in most markets. With respect to 
effects of liberalisation on innovation, evidence indicates that aggregate private spending on 
R&D has diminished. The focus of the companies’ R&D activities moves away from 
fundamental technology innovation (e.g. fuel cell technology or clean-coal generation) towards 
cost-reducing technologies and consumer services. However, given the uncertainty on 
efficiency of pre-liberalisation levels and allocation of R&D spending, this evidence does not 
allow us to reach firm conclusions on whether dynamic efficiency has deteriorated. 
 
Potential policy responses to improve efficiency centre on mechanisms to increase competition 
(e.g. through contracting requirements on dominant players). Also designs of mechanisms for 
cross-border trade have scope for improvement, in order to better reap the benefits of 
integration of markets. In particular, current steps towards ‘market coupling’, a mechanism 
which allows for more efficient utilisation of available transport capacity between countries, 
may lead to larger gains from electricity trade. 
 
In assessing the effects of liberalisation on security of supply, care should be taken in defining 
the concept. One approach would define supply security as the ability to meet demand at  
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affordable prices. In the second perspective, supply security would involve the question whether 
markets are capable of achieving efficient levels of investment in the market. The two 
perspectives would lead to opposing views on the effects of liberalisation. Both theory and 
evidence indicate that in liberalised markets, short-run prices are more volatile and adjustment 
of demand to clear the market becomes more important than before liberalisation. While these 
effects may be viewed as undesirable from the ‘affordable price’ perspective, the larger role of 
demand in clearing the markets is consistent with the ‘efficiency’ perspective. Adequate pricing 
of peak energy consumption allows for lower investment in peak generation capacity, thus 
shifting the supply-demand balance to more efficient levels. Market failures, however, might 
lead to inefficiently low investments. Such failures can result from ineffective market design (or 
from the anticipation of government intervention in prices under scarcity conditions), under 
which market prices fail to reflect the real value of energy. In the regulated markets, devising 
mechanisms to provoke efficient investments is challenging, especially where (cross-border) 
transport capacity is concerned. 
 
Policy concerning security of supply should firstly focus on efficient design of balancing 
markets, especially ensuring that correct price signals occur during periods of scarcity. Where - 
for political reasons - temporary high prices are deemed unacceptable, so that absence of 
intervention cannot be credibly committed to, price caps coupled with mechanisms to ensure 
adequate remuneration of suppliers (such as capacity markets) may be considered as a second 
best alternative. Further promoting the development of liquid markets where consumers can 
insure against price fluctuations may be a less intrusive alternative. 
 
The impact of liberalisation on the environment is ambiguous. While reduction of prices would 
increase consumption of energy, and hence emissions, increased fuel efficiency and shifts in 
technology mix can reduce emissions. The latter effect is sensitive to the country-specific initial 
conditions. 
 
Liberalisation can strengthen the effects of market based environmental policy instruments. One 
major market based instrument is the European Emission Trading Scheme. Market prices for 
emission allowances constitute (real or opportunity) costs to electricity producers, and therefore 
can guide electricity prices and generation decisions in the desired direction. This is so, 
irrespective of the allocation procedure. Some of the allocation rules, however, may distort 
competition and efficiency of generation and investment decisions. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Liberalising European energy markets 
The European energy markets have been going through a process of liberalisation
1 since the 
early 1990s in order to increase efficiency of the supply of energy. This liberalisation process of 
the electricity and natural gas markets is managed through directives of the European 
Commission, mandating non-discriminatory third-party access to the networks in order to 
accommodate entry by competitive suppliers, and making end user markets contestable for 
competing suppliers. 
 
According to the EU Directives on the liberalisation of the electricity and natural gas market, 
the management of both transmission and distribution networks has to be legally and 
functionally unbundled from commercial activities by 2007. European countries have made 
progress in satisfying this requirement in particular in the case of transmission networks. 
Several countries have legally or fully unbundled transmission of both electricity and gas, 
although some unbundled transmission system operators (TSOs) do not have an independent 
management (EC, 2006). Nevertheless, concerns exist about third-party access to the 
transmission infrastructure, in particular in the gas market where third-party shippers appear to 
be subject to more costly access procedures. Moreover, distribution system operators remain 
closely linked to the supply business of the incumbents in a large number of EU countries. 
Consequently, the current level of unbundling in electricity and natural gas markets is viewed to 
be insufficient by regulators and many participants in these markets (EC, 2006). 
 
In its inquiry of the energy markets, the European Commission (EC, 2006) concludes that the 
functioning of the gas and electricity markets is seriously hindered by a number of factors, i.e. 
horizontal concentration, vertical foreclosure (e.g. entrants having limited access to the 
infrastructure), lack of market integration (e.g. incumbents controlling import capacity), lack of 
transparency (e.g. insufficient information on technical availability of interconnectors) and the 
still ill-developed price-formation process (e.g. prices not responding to changes in supply and 
demand). 
 
Although the potentially adverse effects of concentrated markets are widely acknowledged, the 
EU Electricity Directives have not required horizontal separation. Due to the absence of 
proactive regulation and control, the electricity market has shown an ongoing process of 
concentration, which may seriously limit effectiveness of competition (Jamasb, et al., 2005a).
2 
 
1 By ‘liberalisation’ is meant all measures changing the structure or rules on the energy markets, such as privatisation, 
vertical separation, merger control and (de)regulation. 
2 In many European countries, the share of the largest three generation firms in generation is above 60%, while comparable 
figures exist for the retail market (Jamasb et al., 2005a).  
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Also in the gas market, wholesale supply is highly concentrated. In all countries except the 
United Kingdom, incumbent natural gas firms control a large majority of imports as well as 
domestic production. Moreover, market opening is not yet fully realised in all EU-countries. 
Currently, about 75% of the gas in the EU-15 countries is consumed by end-users who are free 
to choose their gas suppliers (Eurostat, 2005).  
1.2  Welfare effects of liberalisation 
The welfare effects of introducing competition in energy markets have been subject to debate. 
As Joskow (2003) states, “replacing the hierarchical governance arrangements with well 
functioning decentralised market mechanisms is a very significant technical challenge, about 
which even the best experts have disagreements”. The key challenge in electricity liberalisation 
is dealing with the tension between the desire for efficient markets on the one hand and for 
long-term investment on the other (Newbery, 2002b). In decentralised competitive electricity 
markets, investments in (peak) generation plants are risky due to highly uncertain prices during 
periods of peak demand, possibly leading to inefficient levels of investments. In less 
competitive (oligopoly or monopoly) markets, control over prices reduces this uncertainty but 
results in allocative inefficiencies and also in inefficient levels of investment. 
 
In his assessment of experiences in the United States, Joskow (2003) concludes that the 
liberalisation process “has encountered more problems and proceeded less quickly than some 
had anticipated when the first restructuring and competition programs were first being 
implemented in the late 1990s”. In California, for instance, retail prices increased by 30 to 40% 
due to market design imperfections, market power problems and poor responses of federal and 
state authorities. On the other hand, liberalisation of electricity markets in the United States has 
also produced successes, such as substantial investments in new generating plants by merchant 
generating companies as well as lower electricity prices for the largest customers (Joskow, 
2003). 
 
The most appropriate structure of the electricity industry is still an inconclusive issue, also 
because models which work well in some circumstances perform less in other places (Newbery, 
2002a). On some issues, however, theoretical and empirical evidence is quite straightforward. 
Practice shows, for instance, that ownership unbundling of the transmission system operation 
from competitive activities improves welfare. 
 
In addition to the efficiency considerations, the liberalisation of the gas market has generated 
concerns about security of supply. IEA (2004), for instance, states that the key question is 
“whether the (gas) market itself will value security of supply and deliver timely signals and  
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competitive incentives for investments to guarantee  secure and reliable gas supply all the way 
to the final consumer.” 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of competition likely also affects patterns of energy production as 
well as consumption and, hence, causes environmental effects. The net sign of these effects is 
not clear in advance as different types of effects could emerge: both price and substitution 
effects. For instance, the opening of markets might encourage the supply from small-scale 
combined-heat-power (CHP) power plants, reducing overall emissions, while it may also lower 
prices, and hence raise total emissions. 
1.3  Scope of the research and the structure of the document 
This document presents an assessment of the effects of liberalising the European electricity and 
gas markets, addressing the following questions: 
 
·  What are effects of liberalisation of energy markets in terms of efficiency, security of supply 
and environment? 
·  What are efficient policy options to improve the performance of energy markets?  
 
By ‘liberalisation’ we refer to the all measures changing the structure or rules on the energy 
markets, such as privatisation, vertical separation, merger control and (de)regulation. We first 
describe the current situation in the EU Member countries in chapter 2, after which we analyse 
the effects of the reforms. We distinguish effects on efficiency (chapter 3), security of supply 
(chapter 4) and environment (chapter 5). The analysis in each chapter is divided in two main 
parts. The first part is an analysis of the impact of liberalisation on efficiency, security of supply 
and environment, respectively. The second part focuses on policy options, both at the national 
and the European level, to improve the performance of energy markets. In this part, we also 
discuss interactions between the different types of policy measures. 
 
The analyses of the effects on efficiency as well as security of supply involve both the gas 
market and the electricity market. In analysing these markets, we pay attention to the different 
parts of the industry chain: production, transport, wholesale, distribution and retail. 
 
The environmental chapter is restricted to the electricity industry given its relatively high 
environmental impact. In this chapter, however, we give more attention to the effects of 
environmental policy measures on the competitiveness of the European economy.  
  14  
  15 
2  Reforms in European Energy markets 
2.1  Introduction 
In this chapter we review the market situation in different EU Member States, highlighting 
important implementation issues. Liberalisation reforms in the energy sector in the European 
Union began with the electricity industry. The EU Gas Directives were adopted later, which 
explains why the situation in the electricity industry in the EU Member States is generally 
somewhat more developed than for the gas industry. This chapter includes selected indices of 
market performance in different segments of the energy supply chain, covering the development 
in transmission and distribution networks, wholesale markets and retail markets. The overview 
is based on the recent figures from the (preliminary) report of the European Commission on 
Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity Market (EC, 2005). 
2.2  Current situation by industry segment 
2.2.1  Network access  
Non-discriminatory access to the networks is an important condition for competition. In order to 
create this condition, a sufficient degree of unbundling of network from commercial businesses 
and tariff regulation are necessary. Table 2.1. below gives an overview of the current 
unbundling situation, based on the recent report by the European Commission (2005). We 
observe a stronger degree of unbundling for transmission system operators (TSO) than for 
distribution system operators (DSO). Evaluating the situation with DSO unbundling in 
electricity, the European Commission (2005, p.80 of Technical Annexes) concludes that 
“Although legal unbundling is not required until 2007, it would appear that [...] many Member 
States have failed to implement the basic requirements of management and account unbundling 
that are already required.” For gas, “Several Member States [...] intend to implement legal 
unbundling of DSOs not before July 2007, while many Member States fully apply the de-
minimis rule.” (EC, 2005, p. 82 of Technical Annexes.) Also, many regulators express concerns 
about discriminatory practices of networks.  
 
In an international context, interconnection between national markets is important for the 
development of the EU market. In the electricity industry, some EU countries feature a very low 
interconnection level. The level of import capacity relative to installed capacity is especially 
low in Italy (8%), Portugal (8%), Spain (4%), the UK (3%), Poland (10%) and Baltic states 
(collectively 0%). (Source: EC, 2005.) In addition to this, efficient allocation of the existing 
capacity remains an issue in many EU Member States, which do not make a sufficient amount 
of interconnection capacity available for cross-border transactions. As a result, wholesale 
electricity markets in the EU are segmented. The same holds for the gas industry, even though  
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over 60% of gas used in the EU crosses a border. There is only little flexibility for gas network 
users of changing their standard delivery patterns, because many network routes are reserved 
for one or two users. Hence, also gas markets are not strongly integrated and remain largely 
national. 
 
Table 2.1  Unbundling network operators: Legal unbundling implemented? 
  Electricity  Gas 
         
  TSO
a  DSO  TSO
a  DSO 
         
Austria   yes  no  yes  yes 
Belgium  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Denmark   yes and ownership  yes  yes and ownership  yes 
Finland   yes, state overlap  yes     
France   yes, state overlap  no  yes, state overlap  no 
Germany   yes  no  partly  no 
Greece   yes, state overlap  no     
Ireland   yes, state overlap  no  no  no 
Italy   yes and ownership  see note
b  yes and ownership  yes 
Luxembourg   yes  no  no  no 
Netherlands   yes and ownership  yes  yes and ownership  yes 
Portugal   yes and ownership
b  see note
b     
Spain   yes and ownership  see note
b  yes  see note
b 
Sweden   yes, state overlap  yes  yes and ownership  no 
UK   yes and ownership  yes  yes and ownership  yes and ownership 
Norway   yes, state overlap  yes     
Estonia   yes  yes  no  no 
Latvia   yes  no  no  no 
Lithuania   yes, state overlap  yes  no  no 
Poland   yes, state overlap  no  yes  no 
Czech Rep.   yes, state overlap  no  no  no 
Slovakia   yes, state overlap  no  no  no 
Hungary   yes, state overlap  see note
b  yes  no 
Slovenia   yes, state overlap    yes
c  no 
Cyprus  no       
Malta  -       
 
Source: EC(2005), based on Regulators data. 
a
 “State overlap” where the state owns the TSO and also has a shareholding in one or more suppliers. 
b
 In Italy, Portugal, Hungary (electricity) and Spain (electricity and gas) the DSO is also a default supplier. However, suppliers to non-
regulated customers must be legally unbundled. 
c
 Incorporating corrections. 
 
2.2.2  Wholesale markets  
The available indicators of the wholesale market competitiveness are mainly those concerning 
market structure. Table 2.2 below gives an impression of the relative position of the EU 
countries with respect to the concentration in their wholesale markets at the end of 2004, based  
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on selected indicators from the recent report of the EC (2005). The table covers both electricity 
and gas. The relevant market in most cases is still a national market. In electricity, the structure 
vary from relatively highly competitive, e.g. in the Nordic market and in the UK, to a highly 
concentrated structure, e.g. in France, Greece, Estonia and Latvia. Concentration is higher for 
gas.    
Table 2.2  Wholesale market position at the end of 2004 
  Electricity  Gas 
  Companies with 5% share 
of production capacity 




Companies with 5% share of 
production and import 
capacity 
C3, Share of 
largest 3 shippers 
 
         
  number  %  number  % 
         
Austria   5   54  1  80 
Belgium   2   95  2  - 
Denmark   10   40  2  97 
Finland   10   40     
France   1   96   2  98 
Germany   5   72  5  ca. 80 
Greece   1   97      
Ireland   2   93  5  84 
Italy   5    65  3  62 
Luxembourg   1   88  1  - 
The Netherlands   4   69  1  85 
Portugal   3   76     
Spain   3   69  4  73 
Sweden   10   40  1  78 
UK   8   39  7  36 
Norway   10   40     
Estonia   1   95  1  100 
Latvia   1   95  1  100 
Lithuania   3   92  4  92 
Poland   7   45  1  100 
Czech Rep.   1   76  -  - 
Slovakia   1   86  1  - 
Hungary   7   66  2  100 
Slovenia   3   87  1  100 
 
Source: EC(2005), based on Regulators data. 
a
 Data for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland relate to entire Nordic market 
 
EU Member countries who are just in the beginning of the development of their wholesale 
markets can learn from the experiences of the other Member States, such as the UK and Nordic 
countries (Nord Pool). Especially experiences with the transition process from monopoly 
provision to the market are important. These experiences stress the role of the government in 
curbing the market power of incumbents and promoting new entry (such as divestitures and 
imposing long-term contracts).  
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For example, three-year vesting contracts and five-year golden share in regional electricity 
companies (RECs) were imposed in the UK in the beginning of liberalisation of the UK 
electricity sector in order to give some time to develop the operation of the market, which 
deterred price increases in this period. When vesting contracts came to the end, new entry of 
independent power producers (IPPs) was stimulated by allowing IPPs to sign long-term gas 
contracts and RECs to sign long-term purchase agreements with IPPs. When the golden shares 
of the RECs lapsed, several RECs were bought by other UK utilities and US utilities. Two 
British incumbent generation companies Powergen and National power also submitted bids, but 
these were blocked by DTI. In response to this Powergen and National power accepted the 
divestiture of 4GW generation capacity each in exchange for the possibility to buy RECs. (See 
OECD/IEA, 2005, for more detail.) In this way a less concentrated wholesale market structure 
was created. 
 
Nord Pool, the Nordic power exchange market, provides an example of an international 
collaboration in creating competitive wholesale electricity market. Norway and Sweden began 
to liberalise their power sector in the beginning of the 90s within an interval of just about one 
year. A common Norwegian and Swedish power exchange was established in 1996 under the 
name Nord Pool, joined later also by Finland (1998) and Denmark (1999). In 2002 the market 
was re-organised.
3 Harmonisation and further integration was taking place in steps, with 
coordinating efforts made by authorities and TSOs, which have contributed to the development 
of the competitive international wholesale electricity market in the Nordic region. (See 
OECD/IEA, 2005, for more detail on this.) 
2.2.3  Retail markets 
The available indices for retail markets are those related to market concentration and to 
intensity of customer activity. Table 2.3 below gives an overview of the concentration indices in 
the EU retail markets for both electricity and gas. We focus on two groups of energy users: 
large industrial users and small (residential) users. Concentration indices for the middle 
segment fall in most cases between the two. We observe that there are still several countries 
with highly concentrated retail markets. Concentration is somewhat lower in electricity as 
compared to gas. 
 
 
3 The Nord Pool Spot became a separate company, with each country’s TSOs taking 20% share and the remaining 20% 
been held by Nord Pool Holding.  
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Table 2.3  Retail market position at the end of 2004 
  Electricity  Gas 
         
  Companies with 
market share over 
5%  
C3, Share of largest 3 




with market  
share over 5% 
C3, Share of largest 3 
suppliers for industrial and  
small customer groups
a  
         
  number  %  number  % 
         
Austria   5   60  4  - 
Belgium
b  3/2   92-100  3/5  90-100 
Denmark   -   -  3  92 and 100 
Finland
c   5   35-40     
France   1   91 and 96  2  - 
Germany   4   -  1  - 
Greece   1  97 and 100     
Ireland   3   99  3  100 
Italy   6    33 and 93  5  54 and 33 
Luxembourg   4   94 and 95  4  93 
The Netherlands
d   3   83  3  83 
Portugal   2   98     
Spain   5   82 and 85  5  72 and 90 
Sweden   3   50  -  - 
UK   6   65 and 59  6  53 and 77 
Norway
e   4   95 and 31     
Estonia   1   95  1  100 
Latvia   1   -  1  100 
Lithuania   3   100  2  100 
Poland   6   50 and 47  7  - 
Czech Rep.   3   95  7  51 and 57 
Slovakia   1   86 and 100  1  100 
Hungary   7   7 and 51  7  77 and 79 
Slovenia   6   67 and 77  6  - 
Cyprus  1  100     
Malta  1  100     
 
Source: EC(2005), based on Regulators data. 
a
 Where C3 differs per customer group, we first give C3 for the group of large industrial users and then C3 for the group of small 
(residential) users.  
b
 Belgium: C3 shows the range for Flanders and Wallonia. No data for Brussels region.  
c
 Finland: C3 shows the range for middle and small customer groups. 
d
 The Netherlands: C3 indicates the market share for small consumers. 
e
 Norway data from 2003. 
 
Switching rates reflect the intensity of customer activity, therefore these indices are considered 
relevant for the assessment of the competition intensity. Table 2.4 below gives the impression 
of customer activity in the EU member states. Switching rates are relatively high in the 
countries that actively promote competition, e.g., the proportion of switchers in electricity 
markets of the UK and Norway is around 50% (EC, 2005), even in the residential group; and 
‘normal switch rate’ in the UK is 1% switches per month (Littlechild, 2006). EC (2005) 
concludes that “in general, experience shows that a high level of customer activity is  
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encouraged where non discriminatory network access is assured and there are enough 
independent competitors in the market to give a degree of real choice.” It also illustrates a 
generally low level of market development in new member states.  
Table 2.4  Percentage of energy consumption having switched – cumulative since market opening 
  Electricity  Gas 
     
  Respective percentages for large industrial 
users and small users 
Respective percentages for power plants + 
large industrial users and small users 
     
  %  % 
     
Austria   29  and  4  6  and  4 
Belgium
a  c. 20  and  10  25  and  9 
Denmark  >50  and  ca. 15  30  and  <2 
Finland   >50  and  30    
France   15  and  0  14  and  0 
Germany  41  and  5    
Greece   2  and  0    
Ireland
b   56  and  9   100  and  0 
Italy
c   60  and -.  23  and  1 
Luxembourg   25  and  0   2
d  and  0 
The Netherlands   - and  11   -  and  5 
Portugal  16   
Spain
c   25  and  19   60  and  2 
Sweden   >50  and  29   - 
UK   >50  and  48   >85  and  47 
Norway   >50  and  44    
Estonia   0   0 
Latvia   0   0 
Lithuania    15  and  0  0 
Poland    19  and  0  0 
Czech Rep.   5  and  0  0 
Slovakia   -  and  0   0 
Hungary   -  and  0  6  and  - 
Slovenia  8  and  0   0 
Cyprus   0    
Malta   0    
Source: EC (2005) based on regulators data. 
a
 The data for Belgium refer to the Flemish region only. 
b
 Ireland (electricity) includes switching to ESB (Independent). 
c
 Italy, Spain includes all customers having left regulated tariffs (i.e. incl. renegotiation). 
d
 Luxembourg: switching rates of 2% corresponds to large customers.  
 
2.3  Conclusions 
The figures and the considerations presented above show the current situation in the electricity 
and gas industry. There are substantial differences in the market development among the EU  
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Member countries. We observe some useful experiences in market development (such as in the 
UK and Nordic countries). On average, the reforms began earlier and have advanced more in 
the electricity industry than in the gas industry. 
 
Although many essential steps have already been taken since beginning of reforming the energy 
sector, creating well-functioning competitive energy markets still faces many challenges. As 
stressed by Jamasb and Pollitt (2005a): “The European electricity market is now approaching 
challenges where, in contrast to the consensus-based minimum requirements of the Directives, 
more specific and technical issues need to be addressed.”   
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3  Liberalisation and efficiency 
3.1  Introduction 
The liberalisation of the energy industry is largely motivated by expected efficiency 
improvements. A more efficient supply of energy contributes to the competitiveness of the 
European economy and, hence, increases welfare. In order to assess the effects on efficiency, 
three efficiency concepts have to be distinguished: productive, allocative and dynamic 
efficiency. See the box below for more detail on measurement issues. 
 
In theory, the relationship between competition and productive efficiency is at least non-
negative (neutral or positive). Traditional theoretical models assume profit-maximising and 
cost-minimising behaviour of firms, which implies that firms  should be always productively 
efficient. Agency models, however, stress the effect of the competitive environment on firms’ 
incentives, concluding that competition increases productive efficiency. 
 
Liberalisation might also improve allocative efficiency as competitive pricing leads to a higher 
demand for services, hence, increasing the sum of  consumer and producer surplus. Moreover, 
as consumer surplus is often weighted higher than producer surplus, a lower price has not 
merely distributional effects but can also be viewed as an improvement of  total welfare. 
 
The effect on dynamic efficiency is complex. On the one side, firms need to have profit in order 
to innovate (the Schumpeterian view), on the other side competitive pressure may lead to 
dynamic efficiency (inefficient firms who do not catch up cannot survive in a competitive 
market). 
 
This chapter first gives a brief overview of the empirical literature on the efficiency effects of 
liberalising the energy sector. Afterwards, the focus is on policy options to improve the 
performance of the energy markets. 
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Box: Efficiency measurement 
There are several simple indicators focusing on one aspect of efficiency that are often used in economic analyses of the 
effect of liberalisation reforms, namely, 
Productive efficiency: change in unit cost  
Allocative efficiency: change in prices and markups  
Dynamic efficiency: change in R&D expenses, change in the number of new products offered 
In addition to these, it is possible to realise more comprehensive efficiency assessments using cost-benefit analyses of 
the reforms implemented, or Frontier methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least 
Squares (COLS) and Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). The latter methods provide the possibility to single out 
relative inefficiencies among firms and to measure the improvement of the best practice and catch-up towards the best 
practice. 
Since there are some differences in the interpretation of efficiency changes that stem from different efficiency-
assessment methods, the distinction among three efficiency forms may not be sharp. For example, frontier studies 
interpret improvements within the current production set as productive efficiency change, and shifts to a technology 
outside of the production set as technical change (dynamic efficiency). In this definition, shifting to a more economic 
production technology can be interpreted in two ways, namely, it is interpreted as productive efficiency change, as long 
as the firm does not outperform the frontier firms; and it is interpreted as a dynamic efficiency gain as soon as the firm 
reaches the frontier. Even though the distinction among different efficiency forms may not be sharp, it is still convenient 
to use it to structure the discussion on effects of liberalisation reforms on efficiency in this chapter. 
 
3.2  Performance of energy markets in improving efficiency 
3.2.1  Productive efficiency 
An economy achieves productive efficiency when it produces a given amount of output at 
minimum total costs. The empirical literature generally finds positive effects of liberalisation on 
productive efficiency of generation plants, both in and outside the EU. Newbery et al. (1997) 
document benefits from privatization and restructuring of the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB) in the UK. These benefits are achieved by shifting from inefficient coal 
production supported by the government to a more economic technology,
4 resulting in a 
structural reduction of generation costs by about 5%. 
 
Empirical studies by Bushnell et al. (2005) and by Fabrizio et al. (2006) for the US show an 
improvement in the efficiency of generation plants after the implementation of reforms. In the 
course of these reforms, some plants were divested and began to compete in the market, while 
some other (non-divested) plants were subject to more stringent regulation. According to 
Bushnell et al., both competition and incentive regulation of generating plants have led to fuel 
efficiency improvements (up to 2%). The authors argue that the change of incentives, but not 
the change of ownership itself, was the main driver of these improvements. Fabrizio et al. 
 
4 Strictly speaking, shift to another technology has also aspects of dynamic efficiency improvement.  
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(2006) find that competitive pressures reduce non-fuel operating expenses of electricity plants. 
In anticipation of increased competition, plant operators most affected by restructuring reduced 
their labour and non-fuel expenses per unit of output by 3-5% relative to other investor-owned 
plants, and by 6-12% relative to government and cooperatively owned plants which were not 
affected by the reforms. Also IEA (2005a) sees an increase in labour productivity in the energy 
industry as a result of reforms. 
 
Besides fuel efficiency and operational efficiency, liberalisation might affect the utilisation of 
production capacity. Steiner (2001) finds for a sample of OECD countries that restructuring 
reforms lead to improved utilization rate and reserve margin in electricity generation. IEA 
(2005a) reports a 12% higher utilisation of generation capacity in New South Wales (Australia) 
compared to the pre-liberalisation period. Also in Europe,  the intensity of using the generation 
capacity increased over the past decades which might be partly the result of liberalisation 
(figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1  Utilisation











1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
%
nuclear conventional total  
Source: Eurostat.  
a
Utilisation is measured as the ratio between actual production and theoretical maximum production given the size of the 
generation capacity. 
 
The increase in capacity utilisation and smaller capacity margins after liberalisation imply that 
liberalisation leads to a decrease in investment. However, this is not necessarily bad, because 
before liberalisation markets were often characterised by overinvestment. In competitive 
markets investment is driven by the expectation of future prices. Limited empirical evidence  
  26 
(mostly on the UK, but also on some other countries) shows that indeed markets respond to 
price signals. For example, growing gas demand in Europe (and a decline of gas production), is 
spurring investment in LNG capacity in for instance the UK, Spain and France (Ernst & Young, 
2006). In addition to the effect on productive efficiency, investment decisions affect reliability 
of supply. See chapter 4 for further detail on this. 
 
Demand participation in the balancing of supply and demand represents an alternative to 
investment in expanding capacity in a liberalised market. Some production and transportation 
capacity is used only in peak hours. The larger demand peaks are, the more capacity is needed 
to maintain the reliability of the system during peak hours, which is costly. The cost of the 
provision of electricity can be reduced by smoothing the demand peaks. This can be done by 
making demand more responsive to market signals. Table 3.1 (from IEA, 2005a), illustrates 
demand participation in several countries. It shows the volumes contractually committed by 
TSOs and observed in the market and assessed to be additionally available at a minimum. The 
highest figures of demand participation are observed in the Nordic market, the most impressive 
examples being the Nordic drought in 2002/03, when both residential consumers in Norway and 
industrial consumers in Norway and Sweden reduced their consumption significantly over a 
period of several months; and a cold spell in Sweden in 2001, during which peak demand in the 
critical hours was reduced with 2 to 3% compared with expected levels. (IEA, 2005a.) 
Table 3.1  Demand participation: committed by TSOs with minimum additional assessed and observed 
demand participation 
  PJM  Nordic  England and Wales  Australia  Alberta (Canada) 
           
Committed (MW)  3598  2075  4329*  n.a.  n.a. 
Percentage of peak load (%)  3  3  7*     
Additional observed and 
assessed (MW) 
7964  10000  800  334  800 
Percentage of peak load (%)  7**  15***  1**  1**  7 
 
* Britain, ** observed, ***observed and assessed. 
Source: IEA (2005a) based on PJM, OFGEM, NORDEL, NEMMCO. 
 
Liberalisation can negatively affect productive efficiency in the electricity industry if market 
power leads to inefficient productive decisions, in the sense that production is not always 
undertaken by the least-cost units. This may happen when firms active on both sides of the spot 
market (selling electricity as generator and buying it as retailer) gain market power. Kühn et al. 
(2004) find for the Spanish market that although market power of large vertically integrated 
sellers and buyers has had little effect on spot market prices, substantial productive 
inefficiencies may have arisen from the exercise of bilateral market power. However, this effect 
might be overstated. Mansur (2003), analysing the effect of vertical links among firms on 
market efficiency and firm conduct in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) electricity  
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markets, emphasizes the effect of production constraints (such as start up costs). Accounting for 
these constraints, the author finds that the costs in the PJM markets were only 3.4% above the 
competitive levels. 
 
Productive efficiency of energy transportation networks may increase as a result of the 
introduction of incentive regulation. Regulators in Europe often choose a price-cap mechanism, 
according to which the prices should change by RPI-X, where RPI represents a price index and 
X represents a productive efficiency target.
5 Firms outperforming this target can keep their 
profit during the regulatory period. The empirical literature shows that firms respond to 
regulatory incentives and reduce their costs. For the UK, there is evidence on cost reductions by 
the National Grid after adoption of sliding scale incentive mechanism, where prices only partly 
reflect changes in costs (see, e.g., Joskow, 2005). Several other studies (Burns et al., 1996, 
Tilley et al., 1999, and Domah et al., 2001) report cost reductions of UK distribution firms after 
the introduction of price-cap regulation, especially towards the end of the second regulation 
period (the end of the nineties). Both selling the golden shares by the British government in 
1995 and stronger regulatory incentives in the second regulatory period could be seen as drivers 
behind these productivity gains. 
Hattori et al. (2003) compare the performance of the UK electricity distribution companies to 
that of Japanese (vertically integrated) utilities between 1985/86 and 1997/98. The industrial 
development in these two countries differs in industrial structure, ownership pattern (British 
companies were privatised in the 90s, while Japanese companies were private since 1951) and 
in regulation methodology (the UK introduced price caps, while Japan had rate-of-return 
regulation
6). They find that productivity gain in the UK, which was implementing major 
restructuring and liberalisation reforms in this period, has been larger than in Japan: on average 
2.5% per year in the UK and 0.7% in Japan. In particular, productivity growth in the UK 
accelerated in the last 3 years, when the utilities began to operate under tightened price caps. 
Decomposition of the productivity growth into technical change and efficiency change shows 
that there was technical progress in the UK, however, the efficiency gap between the companies 
may have widened. Hattori et al. observe significant variations in the level of costs and 
consequently in relative efficiency measures over the years, which arise due to the cyclical 
nature of investment in networks.  
Hjalmarsson et al. (1992) find no significant impact of ownership and economic organisation on 
productivity change of Swedish retail and distribution firms. However, they find a substantial 
influence of economies of density, as well as a relative increase in productivity in rural areas. 
These authors relate this to the mergers of small regional utilities, thereby implying the 
 
5 Sometimes CPI (Consumer Price Index) is used instead of RPI (Retail Price Index). 
6 Rate of return regulation in Japan was slightly modified in 1996, incorporating elements of yardstick regulation.   
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existence of economies of (regional) scale. In a reaction, Mork (1992) states that the lack of 
difference due to ownership follows from the fact that neither private nor the public utilities are 
profit maximizers. In a later Swedish study, Kumbhakar et al. (1998) find that privately owned 
firms in electricity retail and distribution are more efficient than municipal companies. The 
difference in technical progress between public, private and mixed firms, however, appears to 
be small. 
Edvardsen and Forsund (2003) use frontier approach to analyse relative efficiency differences 
among electricity distribution utilities in five EU countries (which includes the Nordic countries 
and the Netherlands). They construct the common production frontier for the utilities from their 
sample and find that there is still a substantial potential for an improvement of operating and 
maintenance costs. Remarkably, the efficient firms, i.e. the firms supporting the frontier, come 
from all five countries, which supports the use of common technology in benchmarking.
7   
In retail, liberalisation has introduced new costs, such as loss of potential economies of scope 
between the network and retail activities and marketing cost. These costs may affect productive 
efficiency negatively. However, since retail cost is a small part of the overall cost, a large effect 
of these costs on overall productive efficiency is unlikely. 
 
The conclusion from this evidence is that liberalisation and other reforms in energy markets 
(such as change of regulation and ownership structure) improve firms’ productive efficiency, if 
this process succeeds to change firms’ incentives. 
3.2.2  Allocative efficiency 
An economy is allocatively efficient when it produces the quantity of goods that optimises total 
welfare. This generally implies that prices equal marginal costs of production
8. Liberalisation is 
expected to lead to competitive pricing and, hence, to improve allocative efficiency. In practice, 
however, the relationship between liberalisation and allocative efficiency is affected by the 
market situation. Market power of firms may lead to inefficient outcomes. Therefore, when 
evaluating the impact of liberalisation on allocative efficiency, it is necessary to address the 
question whether liberalisation reforms have succeeded in creating competitive energy markets. 
 
Although market power is generally measured by the margin between price and the marginal 
cost of production, in electricity markets, market power can still be present even when the price 
equals the marginal cost of the most expensive producing unit. Here, market power can be used 
to raise prices by withdrawing generators having lower marginal costs. Borenstein et al. (2000) 
 
7 The authors also report differences in relative efficiency distribution within each country. In particular, Sweden and Finland 
had the most even distributions of efficiency over companies and the highest share of units above the total sample mean. 
8 Including potential shadow costs if constraints are involved.  
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present an indicator of market power that reflects the difference between the price and the 
marginal cost that would realise if all firms behaved as price takers. According to their estimate 
for California, the average markup over the competitive outcome was 15.7% in the period June 
1998 to September 1999. Mansur (2001) and Bushnell et al. (2002) provide similar analyses for 
the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) and New England electricity markets 
respectively, using somewhat different indicators that are based on the same idea. Comparing 
the results of these three studies over the period when they overlap (May to December 1999), 
controlling for the level of spare generation capacity at the various demand levels, Bushnell et 
al. concludes that “the performance of the two eastern markets was comparable, and that both 
were more competitive than California at all but the highest capacity ratios.”
9 Hence, market 
power can be present even in a fairly unconcentrated electricity market. 
 
There is also some evidence on the allocative efficiency effects of reforms in the UK. Newbery 
et al. (1997) conclude that the productive efficiency gains achieved by privatisation and 
restructuring of the electricity industry mainly went to producers, not to customers. However, 
according to a comment by Littlechild (2006), one should take into account that the prices 
would probably have gone up under state monopoly (regulated by rate-of-return regulation). 
Adopting this view, the benefits of reforms in the UK were actually shared between consumers 
and producers. Analyzing the period of the late 1990s for England and Wales, Sweeting (2005) 
finds that generators exercised considerable market power, despite that market concentration 
was falling. This behaviour was consistent with their tacit collusion or an attempt to raise the 
prices that they could negotiate in future hedging contracts by increasing current spot market 
prices. If tacit collusion was the reason, then this would support the importance of designing 
market institutions in a way that makes tacit collusion difficult to sustain. In this sense, less 
centralised systems (such as NETA, which replaced the Pool system in the UK) should be less 
vulnerable to collusion. Indeed, there was less exercise of market power under NETA.  
To conclude, given the vulnerability of liberalised energy markets to market power, and in view 
of the lack of market integration and increasing horizontal concentration (EC, 2006), European 
energy markets are at risk of not performing well in terms of allocative efficiency.  
 
In transmission and distribution, allocative efficiency benefits are likely positive. Most 
networks are subject to regulated Third-Party Access (TPA). Not only does regulatory pressure 
encourage firms to operate more efficiently, it also leads to more efficient pricing of services, 
and hence to more optimal use of the network by the firms and customers. Customers in many 
countries (such as UK, the Netherlands, Norway) benefited from the price decreases that were 
 
9 Capacity ratio is the ratio of residual demand over capacity. Given that electricity is not storable market power is 
intertemporal. Since capacity is constrained, market power is larger in high-demand periods. For example, Müsgens (2004) 
finds significant market power in the German electricity market, mainly exhibited during peak periods.  
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forced by the X-factors set by regulators. In the UK, for the rate period 1995/6-1999/2000, the 
X-factors for the first two years averaged 14 and 11.5%, and 3% p.a. for the remaining years. 
For the rate period 2000/1-2004/5, the average X factor for the first year was 23.4% (some of 
which accounts for transfers to the supply businesses) and 3% p.a. for the other years. (Pollitt et 
al., 2001).  In the Netherlands, only for electricity the X factors saved the consumers 1.1 billion 
euros over 2001-2006 (Haffner et al., 2005).  
 
In retail, liberalisation generally increases allocative efficiency in the large consumer segment, 
but the effect in the small consumer segment is ambiguous. Large industrial users face lower 
prices than small users
10 for three reasons: their stronger buyer position, less fluctuating 
demand, and lower network cost, since these users are often connected at a higher network 
level, e.g. to transmission networks. Empirical work by Steiner (2001) (for earlier years of 
reforms) presents evidence that liberalisation is associated with a reduction of industrial user 
prices.  
 
The effect of liberalisation on retail prices is less straightforward for small users. Joskow and 
Tirole (2004) stress the problems for retail competition associated with the absence of real-time 
pricing for small users. Other studies highlight the problem which can arise due to consumer 
switching costs (Giulietti et al., 2005 and Pomp et al., 2005). These costs include not only 
switching fees, but also the time and effort of switching. If these costs make consumers 
unwilling to react to lower prices, then the incumbent retailers will be able to extract extra 
consumer surplus. Green (2003) argues that retail competition may lead to reduced long term 
contracting. This in turn could reduce competitiveness of the wholesale markets, and increase 
prices. 
 
Despite these potential problems, a relevant issue is what would be the alternative to retail 
competition. Littlechild (2006) discusses two policy options that seem to be the most reasonable 
alternatives: regulation by benchmarking and tendering. He stresses that both alternatives 
require a large involvement of the regulator, which is also costly. For instance, “Energy 
efficiency obligations on suppliers imposed by the regulator <in the UK> originally cost ₤1 per 
electricity customer per year. The latest proposal by the Government will cost about ₤8 per 
customer per year” (Littlechild, 2006). Besides, benchmarking is not always feasible because of 
the insufficient number of comparators. In the case of tendering (applied in some states in the 
US), the regulator has to determine the terms of tendering, but it is unlikely that the regulator 
knows more about consumer preferences than consumers themselves. So, both alternative 
policies are unlikely to outperform competition. This conclusion is much stronger if we account 
for the welfare increase from product innovations in retail (stressed by Littlechild, 2005; see 
 
10 For example, across member states, current electricity prices for large industrial users are 40-55 euros per MWh, while 
60-150 euros per MWh for small consumers (EC, 2005).  
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also next section), especially those promoting energy-efficient technologies (addressed in 
Directive 2006/32/EC
11). 
The overall picture here is that the allocative efficiency benefits of liberalisation of European 
energy markets have been limited due to insufficient competition on the energy markets up to 
now. If the reforms succeed to adequately improve competition on these markets, allocative 
efficiency benefits could be significant. In networks, however, regulation has generated 
allocative benefits by imposing more efficient prices. 
3.2.3  Dynamic efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency relates to the extent to which innovation occurs that allows future cost and 
benefit functions to change. The relationship between liberalisation and dynamic efficiency is 
not straightforward as competition might stimulate as well as dampen incentives to innovate. 
Evidence on private R&D expenses, which is often used as a measure for innovations, in 
liberalised energy industries suggests that the overall effect of market reforms on private 
innovation activity is negative. R&D activities in the electricity industry in many countries have 
declined over the past decades (e.g. Eurelectric, 2003; Hattori, 2006; IEA, 2005c; Jamasb et al., 
2005b; Sanyal et al., 2005)
12. In the Japanese electricity industry, for instance, the R&D 
intensity, i.e. the ratio between R&D expenditures and total sales, declined since the mid 1990s 
when the process of liberalisation took off (see figure 3.2). We should note that R&D 
expenditure may have been either inefficiently high or ill-directed before liberalisation, when it 
was carried out by intransparently regulated public utilities, which did not necessarily act as 
profit-maximisers. A lower level of R&D expenditures is therefore not necessarily equal to a 
lower level of dynamic efficiency. The question is furthermore whether the decline in R&D is 
related to the process of liberalisation. 
 
11 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and 
energy services and repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC. 
12 Sanyal et al. (2005), for instance, report a decline in the R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditures as a percent of sales) in the 
US electric industry from 7.9% in 1986 to 6.9% in 1996, caused by significant reductions in both state and private R&D 
funding.  
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Source: Hattori (2006) 
 
Jamasb et al. (2005b) conclude that vertical as well as horizontal unbundling of the industry 
negatively affects R&D spending and technology adoption. This negative relationship follows 
from the fact that the size of a firm is an important factor behind innovation. Uncertainty 
created by the introduction of competition is also seen as a factor reducing the level of 
innovation. Regarding the effect of ownership, these authors conclude that privatisation shifts 
the focus of research towards applied and commercial projects. The overall conclusion of 
Jamasb et al. (2005b) is that “competitive electricity markets will deliver sub-optimal amounts 
of R&D input and output”. Where the lower emphasis on profits of public utilities before 
liberalisation, as well as the larger scale of companies, would have mitigated the effects of 
positive externalities associated with knowledge spill-overs, according to these authors, these 
effects would have been exacerbated with the introduction of competition. As a result, 
compared to the pre-liberalised situation, according to these authors, additional policy measures 
are needed to encourage fundamental energy research. 
 
This conclusion is challenged by the results of other authors. In their analysis of the relationship 
between liberalisation and R&D in the US electricity industry, Sanyal et al. (2005) find mixed 
results. They conclude that the uncertainties in the face of anticipated restructuring and 
deregulation has adversely affected R&D activities by energy utilities, while, once having 
occurred, a higher level of deregulation and competition positively affect R&D. A higher 
likelihood of changing the structure of the industry probably creates uncertainty about future 
benefits of investments and, hence, reduces the incentive to invest in R&D. When a higher level  
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of competition has been reached, R&D might be encouraged by the prospects of using new 
technologies to achieve competitive advantages.  
 
Liberalisation might also affect the composition of R&D. Hattori (2006) finds for the Japanese 
electricity industry a shift in the R&D mix towards cost-reducing technologies while R&D in 
joint research programmes for public-interest technologies seems to be reduced. In the latter 
programmes, research is directed at technologies such as clean-coal generation, fuel cell power 
generation and power-system technologies to address the further development of generation 
techniques using combined cycle power and  renewable energy. The author notes, however, that 
the decline in public-interest research may be a result of R&D activities having been genuinely 
ill-directed before liberalisation. 
 
A shift of R&D towards efficiency-enhancing technologies due to liberalisation is confirmed by 
Markard et al. (2006). These authors find a move from technology-oriented innovation towards 
market-oriented innovation. The latter includes both cost-reducing activities and innovations 
directed at new products for consumers. In general, they conclude that liberalisation increases 
the variety of innovation paths. This picture of the impact of liberalisation on R&D is also 
described by Eurelectric (2003). 
 
Hence, liberalisation of the electricity industry does affect the innovation process. The 
composition of R&D activities appears to have changed, becoming more directed at 
technologies contributing to the profit of the industry in the short term. Conversely, company 
funding for more basic research has been reduced in several countries, but it is still an open 
question whether this is the result of termination of inefficient R&D activities or whether it 
indicates a market failure which calls for additional government intervention compared to the 
pre-liberalisation situation. 
 
Besides evidence on R&D expenses, there is also evidence on product innovations in retail. 
Littlechild (2005) stresses the effect of competition on product innovation in retail businesses. 
From the experience of the Nordic electricity market, Littlechild concludes that retail 
competition stimulates the development of new value-added services to customers, such as 
offering new terms of contracts, such as fixed-price contracts of different duration and spot-
price related contracts. In addition, Littlechild (2006) lists numerous recently emerged products, 
such as energy efficiency packages, duel fuel contracts, various discounts (e.g. for self-reading 
meters, for prepayment meters), green tariffs, charity contributions, etc. Hence, liberalisation 
encourages more efficient patterns of energy consumption, and leads to more efficient energy 
use. The recent European Energy Services Directive (2006/32/EC) stresses the positive role of 
product innovation in retail for the development of more efficient energy services.  
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3.3  Policy options to improve efficiency 
3.3.1  Introduction 
Policy options improving efficiency of the energy supply industry are those which improve 
competition in the markets and encourage optimal use and expansion of network capacity. 
These measures can be distinguished into structural (i.e. affecting the industry structure) and 
behavioral measures. Although structural measures are often more effective for competition, 
they also involve higher cost. Therefore, trade-off between these costs and benefits should be 
taken into account in policy design.  
3.3.2  Unbundling, merger control, divesture and privatisation 
A key component of the liberalisation of energy markets is the vertical unbundling of networks 
from production and supply, in order to ensure efficient pricing of network transportation 
services and to create a level playing field for power generators and suppliers, including 
entrants. The latest EU directives require legal unbundling (by 2007) of the networks but, given 
the importance of independent functioning of transmission networks for good market 
facilitation, several EU countries have fully unbundled these networks from commercial 
businesses. Although unbundling is likely to improve the competitive situation, it also involves 
costs. 
The net benefits of ownership unbundling of transmission are widely acknowledged (see e.g. 
Joskow, 2003a, and Jamasb et al., 2005a). In contrast, in the distribution industry less 
experience has been developed. In New Zealand, for instance, separation of network activities 
from retail and generation was followed by an increase in competition and a decrease in 
wholesale prices. However, more factors contributed to this improvement, such as improved 
switching possibilities and splitting of the dominant incumbent. For the Netherlands, Mulder et 
al. (2005) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of ownership unbundling of distribution networks. 
Among the costs of unbundling, they distinguish one-off transaction costs associated with the 
unbundling process, the loss of scope economies, and reduced financial viability of the 
production and supply units that do not hold network assets. On the benefit side, full 
unbundling sharpens the focus of the network on their objectives (such as providing 
transportation services and facilitating access of market players to the network), which 
improves both the position of the regulator and competition conditions in the commercial 
segments of the industry. Besides it enables privatisation of the commercial parts of the 
industry, even in the case if the networks stay in the government hands. Mulder et al. conclude 
that the welfare effects of ownership unbundling are ambiguous as both benefits and costs 
depend on uncertain external factors. For example, a fast development of distributed generation 
would increase sharply the benefits of keeping distribution networks fully independent from  
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generation, while uncertainty about some of the transaction costs associated with unbundling 
may warrant caution. 
 
Despite a clear theoretical argument regarding the adverse effect of a high concentration in the 
industry on the performance of firms, empirical evidence on the effect of merger control is 
scarce because of the unclear counterfactual: what would be the market development if a 
merger actually takes place? Especially in emerging markets, the consequences of a wrongly 
approved merger can be large, therefore, some economists plea for more proactive policy in 
such markets, emphasizing the relevance of strengthening merger control (see e.g. Canoy et al., 
2003). The key issue here is that of the relevant market. At the moment, energy markets in 
Europe are still largely segmented, which urges for the importance of getting the market 
structure right at the national level. At the same time, several important market players become 
active in many countries. Hence, merger control at the EU level becomes important too, 
especially in the light of more integration of the EU markets. Currently, more than two thirds of 
the European electricity market is concentrated in the hands of eight large companies
13, with the 
Europe-wide four-firm concentration ratio at 50%, according to Jamasb and Pollitt (2005a).  
 
The studies on the US show that the performance of generation plants improves after 
restructuring because of the improvement of the incentive structure, which is achieved by 
privatisation and the change of regulation in divested generation plants. Although such 
divestitures are effective, they may involve high cost or be infeasible in practice for political 
reasons. Especially with the trend towards more integration of the EU market, some countries 
are afraid to split their energy companies as they may be taken over by large foreign utilities. In 
these conditions, political lobby groups push towards creating national champions. Behavioral 
measures (discussed hereafter) have also been used to mitigate market power. 
3.3.3  Virtual Power Plants, Long-term contracts and site availability 
Virtual Power Plants (VPP) reduce the scope for strategic playing in the market by reducing the 
amount of the generation capacity over which the dominant producers have discretion in 
bidding. They represent a physical or financial option on electricity. A physical VPP is a 
contract to deliver electricity (against some fixed price); a financial VPP is a contract on price 
which works similarly to a usual insurance contract. Willems (2006) argues that the type of the 
virtual divestiture is unimportant in the case of monopoly, but it does matter in oligopoly 
markets. This is because a physical VPP involves the delegation of production decisions by the 
dominant generator, while a financial VPP does not. Hence, in the oligopoly setting, the spot 
market is more competitive with a physical divestiture than with financial divestiture. 
 
 
13 The eight largest companies are EdF, RWE, EoN, ENEL, Vattenfall, Electrabel  Endesa, Iberdrola.  
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Practical applications of VPPs can be found in several EU countries (such as Belgium, France, 
Italy, Denmark and Czech Republic). For example, in accordance with the agreement between 
the EC and Electricité de France (EdF), the company had to make access to 6 000 MW of 
generation capacity in France available (in exchange for the approval of the EC to acquire a 
further interest in the German electricity utility EnBW in 2001), which is partly done through 
VPPs and partly through Power Purchase Agreements. 
 
Long-term forward contracts decrease both the possibility for a dominant producer to exercise 
market power and the gains from doing so. Examples are the so-called vesting contracts that 
have been used in the US and UK when their electricity industries were restructured. Many 
economists (e.g., Newbery, 2002, Wolak, 2001, Bushnell, 2004) emphasize the importance of 
long-term contracting for stability of electricity markets. For example, Wolak (2001) stresses 
the necessity of “sufficient forward market commitment for fixed-price wholesale electricity to 
cover retail obligations.” Also according to the argument of Green (2003), less long-term 
contracting (as a result of retail competition) results in price increases, especially in the case of 
a large price volatility. 
 
The argument that the introduction of a market for bilateral contracts is helpful in achieving 
more competitive resource allocation is also supported by the theoretical result by Allaz and 
Vila (1993), according to which the introduction of a futures market leads to a tougher price 
competition by producers in the (concentrated) spot market. Empirical evidence on the effect of 
such contracts in European electricity markets is provided, for example, by Herguera (2000) 
who finds that in England and Wales (under the old system of trade) “..less bilateral coverage 
led to price coordination among generators in the pool: the number of price spikes increased 
significantly after 1998 <when many such contracts ended> and the number of plants declared 
unavailable for spot market bidding also increased”. In contrast, none of these happened in the 
Nord Pool market, where the market structure was more evenly distributed and the amount 
bilaterally contracted was increasing. 
 
However, long-term forward contracts may create problems for entrants, as they may decrease 
the liquidity on the market. Another problem arises in particular in gas markets, where the 
incumbent large producers/traders are traditionally  purchasers of such contracts, which leads to 
an increase of these players’ market power. 
 
Incumbent producers often also own or control many of the (scarce) suitable sites for new 
generation plants, enabling them to foreclose the market for new entrants. In theory, dominant 
producers benefit from withholding suitable sites, maintaining their market power. However, it 
is difficult to assess how large this problem is in practice. The literature has some indications 
that the problem of site availability may be important. For instance, Frontier Economics  
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(2006b) reports that the Belgian Energy Regulator (CREG) has indicated that Electrabel may 
own a large proportion of such sites, which may create an additional barrier to market entry. A 
similar problem arises in Austria, where some DSOs try to secure sites for their own affiliated 
companies which increases impediments for market penetration by new market entrants. (Skytte 
et al. 2005). Options to improve site availability are, for example, enforced (negotiated) release 
of sites, requirements to auction vacant sites and revising the licensing agreement to limit the 
scope for capacity expansion by the dominant player. 
3.3.4  Efficient allocation as well extension of transmission capacity 
Optimal use of the European transmission grid involves sending efficient price signals to both 
generators and energy users. Since power flows along different transmission lines are 
interrelated, individual lines cannot be viewed (and priced) in isolation. Coordination among 
TSOs can enhance efficiency of TSO decisions in the EU context. Also, harmonisation of 
regulation is essential for efficiency of the future integrated European market. In order to 
achieve this goal a greater consistency is needed in actions of national regulators in different 
countries (High Level Group, 2006). A necessary condition for this is that the regulators have 
similar powers to promote the market development and to adopt efficiency-increasing policies, 
as well as  policies enhancing security of supply. 
 
With respect to allocation of network capacity, increasingly non-market mechanisms are 
replaced by market mechanisms, such as explicit auctions. Examples of connections where day-
ahead congestion management in the form of explicit auctions have been implemented fairly 
recently are the French-Belgian, French-Spanish and German-Swiss borders (see ETSO, 2004 
and ETSO, 2006). These mechanisms are supposed to deliver efficient capacity allocation, 
however, this is still not always the case in practice. Efficiency would imply that in the presence 
of a price difference between two regions, all transport capacity available between two 
countries is fully utilised. Frequently, however, one observes unutilised capacity in the presence 
of large price differences between neighbouring countries. This may result from illiquidity of 
markets, uncertainty in scheduling flows on a day-ahead basis, or the existence of market 
power. As an example, Dutch regulator DTe concluded in its review of market liquidity on the 
Dutch electricity market (DTe, 2004), that average utilisation of German-Dutch capacity was 
well below 100%, even in those hour where price differences were sizable, and attributed this to 
uncertainty at time of scheduling. Neuhoff  (2004) argues that with explicit auctions, importers 
tend to bid non-price-responsively in spot markets (sometimes resulting in suboptimal flows), in 
order to avoid costly imbalances in case a bid in either spot market is not accepted. The impact 
of market power, and the profitability of withholding import capacity were studied in Joskow et 
al. (2000) and Gilbert et al. (2004).     
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Theoretically, the problem of assigning appropriate prices to generation and load for use of the 
power grid (including capacity taken up by the loop flows) can be solved in a competitive 
market by so-called locational marginal pricing (or nodal pricing), assigning different prices to 
each different location in the transmission system (Hogan, 1992). The price differences between 
these ‘nodes’ reflect the capacity constraints of the transmission links between them, and the 
complicated external effects of input or offtake in one node on the congestion in the various 
links. Such systems of locational marginal prices are in operation in some regions in the US. 
However, appropriate determination of locational prices is only feasible in a centralised system 
where power markets in the system are centrally cleared, which is a long way from the 
European system based mostly on bilateral, decentralised markets that operate in the different 
countries. Such decentralised markets may have their own merits in providing different 
incentives to market participants (Wilson, 2000). Apart from that, giving up national autonomy, 
as required for locational marginal pricing, could be hard to realise politically, and a more 
gradual improvement may be called for (Brunekreeft et al., 2006). 
 
The approach for the allocation of interconnection capacity currently pursued most actively is 
market coupling. In this set-up, instead of auctioning interconnection capacity on individual 
borders to individual market participants, the allocation of transmission capacity on all borders 
in one region is jointly carried out, on the basis of the bids for supply and demand of energy on 
the power exchanges in the regions involved. In this way, energy markets and transmission 
markets are simultaneously cleared, taking into account the relations between flows on the 
different borders. This allows more efficient utilisation, as firstly, flows are based on actual 
rather than predicted price differences, and secondly, the improved information reduces the 
need for (over-)conservative estimates of available transmission capacity (Brunekreeft et al. 
2006). 
 
A separate issue involves the governance of the system operators who decide on availability of 
transmission capacity. The discretion awarded to them creates moral hazard, as they have an 
incentive to reduce effort and costs in solving domestic congestion in favour of pushing 
problems to their systems’ boundaries (Glachant et al., 2003). Improvements could involve 
increased international transparency of procedures and capacity computations and regional 
cooperation among TSOs, regulators and governments (Glachant et al. 2006).    
 
Issues in gas transmission markets are to some extent similar to those in electricity 
transmission. The key difference is that gas markets are currently much less well developed 
than electricity markets in Europe. Access rights to cross-border gas transmission connections 
are largely allocated in long-term contracts, leaving little room for market-based allocation of 
short-term capacity. Furthermore, short-term wholesale markets for gas are in most countries 
still in their infancy. On the other hand, in this situation of ill-developed gas markets, the role  
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for long-term contracts may be more important. Given the longer distances between gas 
production regions (often outside of Europe) and the associated larger specific investments, 
there may be a greater need for long-term contracting, giving rise to a tension. This situation 
will change when markets become more liquid, reducing asset specificity (Mulder et al., 2006). 
 
In the long run, efficiency of the transmission market involves efficient investment in 
transmission capacity expansion. Major policy issues arise with respect to accommodation of 
transit flows and extension of interconnection capacity. 
 
The first issue involves the remuneration of transit flows: expansion of capacity for transporting 
power flows between two regions usually not only involves investment by the two regions’ 
transmission system operators themselves, but also expansion of capacity in grids that are used 
for transit flows. The incentive for capacity investment by the operators of these transit grids 
depends on the ways in which such transit flows lead to remuneration for these grid owners. A 
second issue is to what extent investment in new interconnections may be carried out by 
independent ‘merchant’ parties, and if this occurs, whether these merchant operators should be 
subject to regulation. The trade-off here may be between market failure, leading to potential 
underinvestment by private investors, and regulatory failure, leading to either under or 
overinvestment by regulated transmission investors (see Brunekreeft et al., 2004, for an 
overview of both issues). 
3.3.5  Enhancing end-use efficiency 
In addition to policies directed at the efficiency of the energy production, transportation and 
supply, policies on the demand side stimulating the efficient use of energy by consumers can 
contribute to European competitiveness as well. Retail competition might play an important role 
in demand management and in moving towards energy-efficient technologies on the consumer 
side. Retail innovations in the tariff structure and a wider use of real-time meters
14 lead to a 
more efficient consumption pattern, contributing to the reduction of the cost of energy 
provision. New energy services, such as energy-saving advise and promotion of energy saving 
equipment, can stimulate energy savings by consumers. The recent European Energy Services 
Directive stresses the positive role of product innovation in energy services for energy end-use 
efficiency. It requires Member States to create the conditions for a market for energy services in 
order to improve the implementation of energy-efficiency measures by final consumers. 
 
In a competitive retail market, retailers likely extend their activities to end-user services 
contributing to a more efficient use of energy by reducing the costs of implementing energy-
 
14 The cost of installing such meters is also substantial, therefore, it is a matter of a cost-benefit analysis to decide if these 
‘smart meters’ should be installed in a particular case. Recently there were quite a few examples of promoting switching to 
these meters on relatively large scale. For example, Enel in Italy is replacing 30 mln standard meters with new meters. Also 
in Sweden 5 mln new meters are due to be installed by 2009 (Frontier Economics, 2006a)   
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saving measures. This effect, however, is likely fairly small compared to the impact of other 
factors on energy use, in particular the price of energy. Environmental policy measures raising 
the price of energy, such as the European emissions trading scheme, can have a significant 
effect on energy use (see chapter 5 for more detail on this issue). 
3.4  Conclusion 
Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, we conclude that the change of incentives, 
resulting either from the introduction of competition or from more stringent regulation, has 
generally resulted in more cost-efficient operation. Although the reduced costs have to some 
extent been passed on to consumers, market behaviour raises concerns. Wholesale markets have 
turned out to be particularly vulnerable to market power, as a consequence of both legacy 
industry structure and the specific characteristics of electricity and gas. The viability of 
competition on retail markets, which relies on the willingness of smaller consumers to switch, is 
in most markets yet to be proved. Evidence on effects on innovation indicates that a shift occurs 
in composition of R&D efforts: the companies’ innovation focus moves away from (public-
interest) technology innovation towards cost-reducing technologies and consumer services. 
While aggregate private spending appears to have diminished, the focus on efficiency-
improving innovation seems to have increased.  
 
Potential market power issues in energy markets can be dealt with by developing mechanisms 
fostering competition. In this chapter we listed a number of policy options to do this, including 
both structural (e.g. merger control and unbundling some companies) and behavioural (e.g. 
imposing contracting requirements on dominant players). Also designs of mechanisms for 
cross-border trade have scope for improvement, in order to better reap the benefits of 
integration of markets. In particular, current steps towards ‘market coupling’, a mechanism 
which allows for more efficient utilisation of available transport capacity between countries, 
may lead to improved gains from electricity trade. Finally, we explain the role of the demand 
side in decreasing the cost of energy provision and improving end-use efficiency. 
 
The issues of cross-border market integration can not be solved by each separate country, but 
needs integration and harmonisation of efforts at the EU level, which also calls for a greater 
consistency in actions of national regulators, as stressed by the High Level Group (2006). This 
concerns especially the development of cross-boarder trade between countries and involves the 
measures curbing market power at the European level and the mechanisms stimulating efficient 
use and expansion of interconnection capacity. 
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4  Liberalisation and security of supply 
4.1  Introduction 
In the pre-liberalisation era, investments in the electricity and gas sectors were centrally 
coordinated. Security of supply generally was a responsibility of the incumbent vertically 
integrated monopolist,  which incorporated engineering reliability standards in its decisions on 
capacity investments. The perception of supply security was chiefly that “all customers should 
be able to consume as much electricity as they want at a constant price at any given time” 
(Bushnell, 2005). As a result, the pre-liberalised energy industry was characterised by a high 
level of overcapacity where costs could be passed on to consumers. Moreover, the role of the 
demand side in achieving supply-demand balance was hardly recognised. Liberalisation has led 
to a shift of investment risk from consumers to the investors themselves, creating incentives to 
increase efficiency. In addition, liberalisation gives stronger incentives to consumers to respond 
to supply shortages. 
 
A consequence of the abolition of the supply monopoly is that the responsibility for supply 
security is not anymore assigned explicitly to an identifiable party. Rather, in the liberalised 
environment the market mechanism is relied upon to generate optimal investment. The 
question, therefore, is to what extent the security of supply is compromised by the decentralised 
management of energy supply. In order to answer this question, it is important to note that two 
different perspectives on ‘security of supply’ can be distinguished. 
 
Some view security of supply as guaranteeing a stable supply of energy at an ‘affordable’ price, 
no matter what the circumstances are (see e.g. EC, 2000). The 2005 Directive on Security of 
Supply (2005/89/EC) defines: “security of electricity supply means the ability of an electricity 
system to supply final customers with electricity, (...) the satisfaction of foreseeable demands of 
consumers to use electricity without the need to enforce measures to reduce consumption.” 
Eurostat (2006) views “reliable electricity supply at acceptable prices a key driver to economic 
growth and competitiveness”. The North-American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
defines adequacy as “the ability of the system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy 
requirements of the consumers at all times”, and security as “the ability of the system to 
withstand sudden disturbances” (Meade, 2006). These definitions are close to pre-liberalisation 
goals as they take demand as an exogenous factor.
15 From a purely economic point of view, 
however, the concept of security of supply is related to the efficiency of the provision of 
electricity or gas to consumers. Markets will always show variations in supply and demand, 
 
15 Although the 2005 Directive also stresses the importance of “removing barriers that prevent the use of interruptible 
contracts” and “encouragement of the adoption of real-time demand management technologies”.  
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and, hence, in prices. A reduction in supply allows prices to rise and demand to fall, while an 
upward shift in demand raises prices and, hence, supply. 
 
The two perspectives, therefore, lead to conflicting goals, as from an economic (welfare) point 
of view, supplying all demand is bound to be inefficient, and prices will have to fluctuate to 
clear the markets
16. The remainder of this chapter looks at supply security from both 
perspectives. 
4.2  Performance of energy markets in delivering stable and secure supply 
4.2.1  Volatility of prices 
Liberalisation of markets leads to decentralisation of operational and investment decisions, 
coordinated through the price-forming process. Comparison of prices with short-run marginal 
costs of supplying to the market (or, conversely, marginal value derived from consuming 
energy) informs market participants in making these decisions. In the days of the vertically 
integrated monopolists supplying to consumers in a centralised fashion, such short-term price 
signals were not required, and consumers typically faced average prices for energy (which for 
gas were usually indexed to oil price fluctuations). As a result, liberalisation results in more 
volatile short-run prices, which were effectively hidden under the centralised regime. Compared 
to other commodities, the volatility of short-run prices of electricity and gas is large. As 
examples of the volatility in energy markets, figure 4.1 plots the daily spot prices for the Dutch 
APX electricity market as well as the UK gas market spot prices. While overall volatility of 
prices is noticeable, the short-lived price spikes to values which may exceed normal prices by 
tenfold are particularly striking. 
 
The volatility of prices results from the particular characteristics of electricity and gas, in 
particular the inelasticity of both demand and supply in the short term. These in turn are related 
to the difficulty of storing electricity and the high costs of storing gas, respectively, as well as to 
the strict capacity limit of production and transmission capacities. The high investment costs of 
production equipment makes it uneconomic to keep large amounts of spare capacity available, 
which leads to congestion on infrastructure in times of high demand. This congestion is 







16 Moreover, as Joskow et al. (2006) point out, in an efficient market price insensitive consumers’ demand may have to be 
involuntarily curtailed.  
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The volatility of short term prices need not be worrying for consumers if they can sufficiently 
contract their electricity and gas in longer term contracts. The extent to which longer-term 
contracts are available differs according to the maturity and liquidity of markets. IEA (2005a) 
notes that in the mature Nordic market, traded volumes of longer-term contracts equal over four 
times annual consumption. The financial market for electricity contracts there evolved to grow 
to over eight times total consumption over the first decade of liberalised markets. Also in the 
US Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market, liquidity of the over-the-counter (OTC) 
market is growing fast. Even in slightly less mature markets in Northwest Europe, contract 
prices for 2 to 3 years in advance are quoted and traded (IEA, 2005a). 
 
Also liberalised retail markets seem to be able to provide for longer term contracts to smaller 
consumers. Littlechild (2006) documents the wealth of contract structures that evolved, partially 
in response to price increases due to drought, in the Nordic market. Similarly, in the liberalised 
Dutch retail electricity and gas markets, offers for two or three year fixed price contracts have 
become more common. 
 
While short-term volatility may be less of an issue, volatility on the longer term may be looked 
upon less favourably. Some argue that liberalisation may lead to longer-run price or investment 
cycles, which may result in contract prices being dragged up as well. A case in point might be 
the current longer-term price rises in the UK gas market, where faster than anticipated decline  
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of indigenous production produced a sequence of several winters with tight supply-demand 
conditions (see figure 4.2). 
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Investments in liberalised markets are sometimes characterised as ‘just-in-time’, which may, 
while ex ante optimal, from an ex post perspective actually be just too late in adverse 
conditions. While the UK system so far has been able to withstand the above-mentioned shock 
in terms of balancing supply and demand, this comes at the cost of high prices and significant 
demand response. Before liberalisation, such conditions were less likely to happen as risks of 
overinvestment were not borne by the investor, but by the consumer (who would pay a higher 
average price) as well as, where subsidisation was involved, the tax-payer. As a result, the 
larger margin of spare capacity (to be on the safe side) in the pre-liberalisation period tended to 
dampen such price fluctuations. 
 
The long-run average energy price fluctuations are not incomparable in magnitude to those in 
other commodity markets (e.g. oil, metals). A major difference with these markets is that 
electricity and, to a smaller extent, gas prices are of a more local nature: as a consequence of 
infrastructure capacity constraints, global arbitrage of prices cannot occur (see e.g. figure 4.2 
for differences between UK and US prices). Average price conditions among various local 
markets may diverge more significantly than in other commodity markets, creating larger 
fluctuations in relative competitiveness between regions, and potentially reducing liquidity of 
forward markets. Long-run price fluctuations may be manageable by consumers through long- 
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term fixed price contracts. However, a market for such longer term contracts (of many years’ 
duration) does not appear liquid. 
4.2.2  Meeting all consumer demand 
Shortages may occur in gas and power markets as a consequence of inadequacy of generation 
capacity, outages in the transmission system, or local problems in distribution grids. One may 
furthermore distinguish between involuntary curtailment of consumers and controlled demand 
reduction, or economic shortage. 
 
Real physical shortages
17 have always been mainly restricted to problems in system 
management or distribution grids, and have not in general been caused by insufficient 
production capacity. A well-known exception might be the Californian power crisis, where 
indeed consumers did experience (controlled) forced disconnections. Even here, as explained in 
Bushnell (2004), this appeared not so much a consequence of insufficient capacity, but rather of 
insolvability of the utility firms.  
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Source: Bye (2003) 
 
On the supply side of the market, on the other hand, economic shortages (closing of production 
activities because of high energy prices) have been more widespread: liberalised markets do 
generate market prices where consumers decide to reduce their energy use. In the UK gas 
 
17 In power markets, these would either be uncontrolled black-outs, or controlled rotating black-outs, brown-outs (voltage 
reductions below normal operational limits), or forced interruptions of industrial users.  
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market, for instance, demand response over the high priced winter 05/06 was significant. 
Regulator Ofgem estimated this as up to 10% of total gas consumption; the majority of this 
came about by electricity producers switching to other fuels. Energy intensive firms (e.g. in the 
ceramics and paper industries) shut down during large parts of winter. Also in the US, higher 
gas prices have led to the delocation of some of the more energy intensive consumers (e.g. 
fertilizer production, see Fertilizer Institute, 2005). In the Norwegian market, in the 2002-2003 
winter, price spikes emerged, provoking significant demand response, even from domestic 
consumers, who were generally on short-term contracts and were therefore soon confronted 
with the price rise, and as a result the market coped remarkably well in preserving supply-
demand balance (Bye, 2003; see figure 4.3). 
 
Apart from actual experience of incidents where economic shortages appeared, one may also 
investigate whether risks of supply shortages have increased since liberalisation. One indicator 
of this is the evolution of spare electricity generation capacity after liberalisation. Declining 
capacity margins make the system more susceptible to incidental supply shortage. In the EU-15, 
the growth in electricity demand over the last two decades has slightly outpaced growth in 
capacity: average utilisation of capacity increased by 7% (see also figure 3.1). Focussing on 
individual technologies, it appears that the average spare margin
18 on nuclear and conventional 
capacity has decreased (with utilisation rates increasing by over 10% for each) (Eurostat). When 
focussing on the last 5 years, this trend is even more apparent. 
 
The lower margins of flexible capacity in EU-15 have to be viewed in the perspective of 
increased power trade among countries. In addition, allocation of rights to use interconnection 
capacity has become more flexible and swifter response of power flows to short-run local 
supply or demand changes is now possible. As a result, by better pooling of national spare 
capacity margins (diversification), similar levels of security may be attained with lower 
capacity margins. 
 
Another indicator of risks of supply shocks is the level of diversification of supplies. More 
diversity of supplies leads to pooling of risks of interruption of supplies from individual 
sources. This leads to lower aggregate risk provided the alternatives are equally reliable
19, and 
shocks are uncorrelated. In electricity generation, one often looks at diversity of technology 
(and fuel) of electricity production. It is evident that gas-fuelled production and wind energy 
have grown significantly, at the expense of nuclear and, mostly, coal (see figure 4.4). Given the 
traditionally high shares of the latter two fuels, diversification seems to have increased. This is 
 
18 Defined as the ratio of available capacity from these technologies and annual output. 
19 Risks of different technologies do obviously differ in practice. Gas, for instance, is generally viewed to be more vulnerable 
to political risk.  
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indeed confirmed by analysis of diversity indices in the UK (see Grubb et al., 2006), but may 
differ per country. 
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In gas, diversification is often associated with geographic sources of gas. Currently, imports of 
gas into Europe come predominantly from Russia, Algeria and Norway (IEA, 2004). As 
indigenous European production is declining over the next decade, the reliance on imports will 
only increase. Risks can be related both to (political and technical) production risks, and to 
transit and facility risks, which may increase as transit routes become longer. The importance 
(and risk) of dependence on specific facilities is exemplified by the 1998 Longford incident in 
Victoria, Australia, where domestic and business consumers’ supplies were cut during two 
weeks, in the wake of an explosion at the Longford gas processing plant. All supplies depended 
on this plant (NERA, 2002). Such dependence of large volumes of gas on single pieces of 
infrastructure is not uncommon (and often indeed motivated by cost efficiencies). For example, 
for the UK, NERA (2002) and Stern (2003) point to the importance of the Bacton gas terminal 
in delivering gas to the country. Experience in recent winter demonstrates the effect of loss of 
the Rough storage facility, which accounts for some 80% of UK storage capacity. 
 
It is not obvious that liberalisation leads to more or less diversification. Generation portfolios in 
the traditional systems may have been biased towards some technologies (e.g. as a result of coal 
subsidisation in the UK before liberalisation), while liberalised markets may focus on different  
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technologies. The Longford incident in Australia was attributed to the monopolistic status of the 
gas sector. However, if observed  current (lack of) diversity gives rise to political concerns, this 
may necessitate policy measures complementing the liberalised market. 
4.2.3  Reliability of networks  
The reliability of the electricity generation system is intimately connected with security of the 
transmission system. Indeed, major power failures of recent years did not originate from 
inadequacy of generation capacity, but were a consequence of failures of system operations. 
System operators are in charge of keeping electricity demand and supply balance intact over the 
network. Failure to do so results firstly in overloaded transmission lines, and soon afterwards 
from loss of equipment that may send the system into a cascade of failing components and loss 
of power over large areas. Well known examples are the 2003 black-outs in the Eastern US and 
Canada, leaving 50 million people disconnected for up to 4 days, and in Switzerland and Italy, 
that left Italy without power for a day. 
 
IEA (2005b) provides some evidence indicating that the frequency and extent of  (smaller) 
North-American outages may have increased since the early 90s. Secondly, IEA also notes that 
larger black-outs occur mostly when systems operate close to their security limits. EU-15 cross-
border trade volume has increased by 4% per annum over the last decade, compared to a 2% 
increase in generation (Eurostat). As a result of liberalisation and increased trade, many 
interconnections between European countries are congested a large part of the time (UCTE, 
2005). 
 
Another reason for strain on transmission capacity may be the higher share of intermittent 
generation (in particular, wind) in Europe. The more erratic supply patterns resulting from this 
cause larger short-turn variation in transmission flows across European networks, and hence 
place greater strains on reliability. A near-incident challenging stability of the Belgian power 
grid as a result of German wind production is an example of this (UCTE, 2005). 
The impact of liberalisation on the distribution sector is mainly through stronger requirements 
on unbundling and regulation in the member states. A drive for efficiency as a result of 
increased regulatory incentives might compromise distribution grid quality, though this much 
depends on the form of regulation. Figures on outages in the UK grid do not show significant 
increases of distribution disruptions, while outages as a result of planned maintenance have 
decreased (see CPB, 2004). 
4.3  Performance of energy markets in delivering an efficient level of supply  
From a welfare economic point of view, the question of an optimum level of supply security 
can be rephrased as whether the market succeeds in achieving efficient balancing of supply and  
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demand in the short run, and efficient levels of investment in the long run. Efficiency does 
require that short run prices fluctuate to reflect changing supply and demand conditions. While 
in many periods, prices will be related to marginal costs of supply (in efficient markets), in 
periods of scarcity prices rise to willingness to pay by consumers. Prices in both regimes may 
differ by orders of magnitude, where the high prices may be required to recover the 
investments. In these periods, furthermore, not all demand will be met. Security of supply 
interpreted in terms of short- and long-run efficiency is therefore at odds with the concepts of 
supply security analysed above. 
 
The evidence of fluctuating prices and demand response presented so far may be consistent with 
a drive towards efficiency. Since security of supply is itself costly, the optimal benefit-cost 
situation may well involve lower levels of supply security than those enforced by central 
planners in the past or currently imposed through public-service obligations. In this approach, 
policy measures may be called for when markets may fail to achieve the efficient level of 
supply. 
 
An evident reason for intervention in energy markets exists because small consumers are not 
aware of (real-time) electricity prices and many consumers do not have the opportunity to react 
to short-lived price rises by reducing their demand. The potential failure to balance the system 
as a result of such demand rigidities might lead to system collapse, imposing an externality on 
all users. System security is therefore a public good. In practice, the solution adopted to this 
failure is that responsibility for balancing the system and making decisions on curtailing 
consumption is assigned to a system operator. 
 
Uncertainty over peak prices is sometimes mentioned as impediment to efficient investments. 
Producers would not invest if they perceive the revenues to be too risky. This argument 
disregards the fact that not investing would be equally risky to those being short in energy: 
consumers or those from whom they contract energy. However, market failures may also occur 
if prices in periods of price spikes do not adequately reflect the value of energy. This may result 
from ill-designed real-time (balancing) markets (or balancing mechanisms), but also for 
instance from (investors’ anticipation of) interventions by governments or system operators in 
mitigating temporary price rises (e.g. Bushnell, 2005). As Joskow (2005) points out, especially 
under scarcity conditions prices will be extremely sensitive to the system operator’s 
discretionary actions. 
 
Incompleteness of markets can also result in suboptimal behaviour. If markets, in particular for 
long-term contracts, are not sufficiently liquid, optimal transactions may fail to take place. 
Reasons for insufficient long-term contracting may arise from transaction costs, but also from 
inadequate design of retail markets. If consumers favour contracting with financially unreliable  
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retailers since they are not exposed to the imbalance costs in the event of the retailer’s 
bankruptcy, insufficient contracting may result (Bushnell, 2005). 
 
Do markets deliver suboptimal diversity? Again, when risks of certain sources or technologies 
translate into adequate price risk exposure to those contracting from these sources, market 
parties internalise those risks. An exception might occur in the gas market, if increased 
dependence on (political) sources increases these sources’ incentives to interrupt supplies to 
achieve political goals. In addition, there is an obvious public good involved in trade relations 
and international frameworks of property rights: foreign policy affects costs and risks of 
international supplies. 
 
As to technology choice, there is, finally, a clear environmental externality. In addition, 
Neuhoff et al. (2005) argue that in the presence of market power, base load plants (i.e. the low 
marginal cost plants producing across all hours of the day) or intermittent generation benefit 
less from exercise of market power than peak plant. The equilibrium mix of technologies may 
therefore be distorted under market power. 
 
Regarding transmission and distribution, optimal regulation should incorporate incentives for 
internalising reliability of the grids. A difficulty in transmission grid regulation in particular is 
that local grids’ security is intimately connected to operations in adjacent grids (that will 
typically be regulated by different regulators). This creates moral hazard where operators can 
shift responsibilities to adjacent operators (see e.g. Glachant et al., 2003). In addition, benefits 
of investments spill over to other operators, and are sensitive to (imperfect) compensation 
mechanisms for transit flows. 
4.4  Policy options  
4.4.1  Design of balancing markets 
As discussed, the cornerstone of market efficiency lies in prices that adequately reflect the (real-
time) value of electricity or gas, as well as market actors’ decisions that translate into exposure 
to these prices. This allows market players to internalise the effects of their actions on the 
supply security of the system. 
 
Most transactions in the wholesale electricity and gas markets are regular contracts between 
private counterparties, where rights and responsibilities are well-defined. The special features of 
these markets are reflected in the necessity of centrally-run balancing markets. Both in 
electricity and gas markets, given the public-good character of system security, the system has 
to be managed by an operator having the responsibility for keeping the system in balance. The 
system operator translates its responsibilities into obligations on users of the system through the  
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design of a balancing regime with associated rights and responsibilities. Under the balancing 
regime, market parties generally have rights to execute (balanced) transactions, but are charged 
for imbalances between input into the system, and offtake from the system. The design of the 
balancing arrangements is critical in appropriately making market parties internalise the 
consequences of their decisions. In particular, efficiency requires that real-time prices reflect 
real-time value of electricity or gas, in order to give adequate incentives to participants to 
contribute to supply security. 
 
All other contract prices (in day-ahead and longer-term markets) are essentially forward prices 
on the balancing price, so that inadequate design of this market feeds through into flawed 
pricing in the complete wholesale market. As an example, if market parties anticipate that a 
supply incident (such as a pipeline outage) will not result in costly imbalances, there will be no 
incentive to hedge against such incidents through longer term contracts. Moreover, there will be 
no need of adjusting behaviour to reduce exposure to such incidents, leading to overreliance on 
the supply source. 
 
Not all EU markets have so far implemented market-based balancing arrangements in gas and 
electricity markets, relying instead on balancing mechanisms whose prices at best imperfectly 
reflect the real system balancing situation. Introducing such markets would be a first step 
towards ensuring adequate market provision of supply security.  
 
Secondly, in particular (balancing) prices in situations of system tightness are crucial in 
provoking behaviour consistent with optimal supply security. Ex ante transparency on system 
operator disconnection policy in case of real-time shortage, as well as pricing behaviour under 
these conditions, can signal that system operators will allow prices to reflect scarcity, and that 
governments will refrain from interfering in the market in these events, thus providing 
assurance to investors. A principal component of such policies would be the definition of the 
so-called value of lost load, or the average value attached to remaining connected by smaller 
customers (who cannot independently decide to disconnect). Values for price caps adopted in 
various systems across the world are given in table 4.1. In effect, this price would serve as a 
price cap in the market, since when the market price exceeds the cap it is, by definition, welfare 
improving to stop supplies to these consumers. Conversely, whenever non-price-responsive 
consumers are disconnected to solve balancing problems, the (efficient) price for balancing 
power would equal this disconnection value. Furthermore those consumers disconnected (or the 
suppliers responsible for them) are in this case suppliers of balancing power to the market, and 
it should be ex ante specified whether they would be remunerated as such.  
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Table 4.1  Price caps (per MWh) in various electricity markets (from IEA, 2005a) 
PJM  Australia  Britain  Denmark  Finland  Norway  Sweden 
             
USD 1000  AUD 10 000  none  none  none  NOK 50 000  SEK 20 000 
EUR 830  EUR 6 250        EUR 6 300  EUR 2 100 
 
4.4.2  Price and capacity regulation of wholesale markets 
If high prices reflecting scarcity are either not (politically) acceptable, or cannot be credibly 
committed to by government or system operators, capping prices at some maximum level may 
be considered. To keep incentives for investment optimal, this requires additional compensation 
for investors to make up for those profits that would have occurred in hours of scarcity. Various 
methods to provide such payments have been considered. In the United States, various regions, 
in particular in the North-East, have so-called Installed Capacity (ICAP) markets, where 
electricity suppliers have to buy sufficient ‘capacity credits’ from generators. The amount of 
these credits is related to the buyer’s level of peak demand. Credits, being limited in supply, 
command a positive price. Sales of credits forms a source of revenues to generators in addition 
to electricity prices, and contributes to the maintenance of a margin of supply over peak 
demand. Effectively, the required margin is set by the regulator. Such a system was advocated 
more generally by the federal regulator FERC in its so-called Standard Market Design, a 
programme developed after the California crisis. 
 
An alternative mechanism is that of capacity payments, or subsidies related to having 
generation capacity available. In England and Wales, the so-called Pool, which offered capacity 
payments in addition to a price for electricity, was abandoned in 2000 in favour of the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). One of the reasons was that the Pool mechanism 
turned out to be sensitive to market power in the UK market (Newbery, 2005). Also in Spain, a 
capacity mechanism is implemented, the details of which have continued to be subject of much 
debate (Batlle et al., 2006).  In the Netherlands, concerns over inadequate investment in 
generation were met by the introduction of a ‘safety net’, providing the system operator with the 
possibility to contract additional reserves to mitigate damage in case of a system emergency. 
The system was designed to interfere minimally with ordinary market operation (see Lijesen 
and Zwart, 2005). However, as producers appear to have responded to the tightening supply 
situation by increasing investment, it was concluded that implementation of the system was not 
yet called for (TenneT, 2005).  Brunekreeft (2005) notes that in Scandinavia, except Sweden, 
there are no plans for central acquisition of capacity. 
 
Disadvantages of such approaches are the necessity of detailed regulation and central planning 
of required capacity. In the credits system, the regulator has to determine the level of capacity 
required to be contracted by consumers, the penalty for non-compliance, as well as the price cap  
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in the wholesale market. In addition, in integrated systems, a price-capped system will lead to 
muted incentives on market participants for providing system security in times of stress, since 
the benefits of making available additional supplies or reducing demand are lower (see e.g. 
Hogan, 2005, and Batlle et al., 2006). Too low price caps will effectively eliminate all potential 
for demand side participation. Furthermore, in integrated systems, price caps might give 
perverse incentives to lean on the system and export power to regions not affected by the cap.  
Price caps are sometimes advocated as a device for market power mitigation. However, as 
argued by Bushnell (2005) and Joskow et al. (2006), market power might well migrate to the 
capacity market instead.  
 
Insofar as inadequate contracting (and inability of consumers to hedge against price volatility) 
is the cause of concern, measures may be taken to improve liquidity of contract markets. This 
may require regulation on market transparency, regulatory endorsement of market places, but 
potentially also requirements on retail firms to hedge their price risks, and avoidance of 
regulation that provides consumers (low) default rates to switch to in times of high prices. The 
latter would lead retailers to shy away from purchasing power or gas on longer term contracts, 
as their customer base would decline as soon as spot prices would drop below the long-term 
contract price.  
 
More draconian measures would be to force long-term (option) contracts on consumers (see e.g. 
Perez-Arriaga, 1999, Oren, 2005, and Hogan, 2005). Such proposals, which have so far not 
been implemented anywhere, resemble capacity credit schemes to some extent. Selling an 
option obliges generators, when prices rise above an agreed strike price, to remunerate 
consumers, the buyers of the options, the price difference. The gains from the contract sales 
should provide the investors with sufficient return on their investments. Such obliged contracts 
may mainly have merit if risk averse consumers have no access to (long-run) contracts 
protecting them from occasional price rises. Littlechild (2006) demonstrates that absence of 
such regulation may result in desired outcomes as well, with those consumers that prefer such 
price protection voluntarily contracting with suppliers. Other measures may be support for 
industrial consumers in negotiating collectively long-term contracts with producers, as e.g. 
occurs in France (Ministère de l’Economie, 2005) and the Netherlands (Electrabel Nieuwsbrief, 
2005). 
4.4.3  Encouraging liquidity of  markets 
A liquid market gives a number of benefits to market players, both at the supply and the 
demand side. On the demand side, market liquidity allows consumers to efficiently hedge their 
exposure to short-term price fluctuations, and to take advantage of their ability to respond by 
reducing demand when this is profitable in case of short-lived price rises (potentially through 
the services of specialised intermediaries).  
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On the supply side, apart from a loss in efficiency as a result of a failure in adequate trading 
among players, a lack of volume and depth of the wholesale market is also likely to prove an 
entry barrier for new players investing in the market. A liquid market lowers transaction costs 
for new players in the market (e.g. entrants in the retail supply market) and facilitates entry of 
independent investors (in for instance LNG terminals) by reducing potential hold up problems. 
This is because liquidity of the market strongly decreases the asset specificity and the ensuing 
need for long-term contracts (see box ‘Liquidity of the market and investments’). As a result, 
liquidity of markets may decrease market power and, by removing investment barriers, increase 
efficiency of investments. 
 
The emergence of liquid markets may also change the motivation for investment. Whereas in 
the past, market parties would invest in e.g. storage in accordance with their needs to balance 
their own supply portfolios, increased market liquidity offers more opportunities to build 
storage capacity for the purpose of trading, making use of (shorter-term) fluctuations in supply 
and demand. In the gas market this increases the focus on flexible short-term storage such as 
salt caverns, while in electricity, flexible gas plants may become more attractive. The mix of 
supply assets may therefore change. 
 
It should not be concluded that competitive and liquid markets will call forth more investments 
in infrastructure than relatively non-liquid markets dominated by incumbents. Indeed, one of the 
goals of liberalisation was to avoid overinvestment in infrastructure. Dominant incumbent 
parties typically do not face hold-up risks if they themselves control the end-user markets and 
can shift costs towards captive consumers. It does seem true, however, that liquid markets, by 
removing a barrier for entry, can attract a more diverse range of investors, introducing 
investment competition that favours the more efficient investors.   
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Box: Liquidity of the market and investments 
Assets in the gas market (such as LNG terminals, storage facilities, production) are of a long-lived nature. Market 
parties, in their decision to invest, will only invest if the prospect of reaping the future rewards for these investments is 
sufficiently certain. Risks may include both price and volume risks. Of particular concern is the danger of opportunistic 
behaviour when large initial, relation-specific investments are involved (Williamson, 1979). After the investment has 
been sunk, a buyer has the incentive to exploit its bargaining power to expropriate the resulting rents. Anticipating this, 
the investor does not invest, or is ’held up’. 
The standard answer to such hold-up problems is the use of long-term contracts, which indeed abound in the gas 
industry.  For  Dutch  gas  producers,  such  contracts  are  mainly  used  to  mitigate  volume  risk:  contract  prices  are 
renegotiated annually, with prices within the year being updated on the basis of price movements in baskets of traded 
commodities. Most long-term contracts have some degree of price flexibility (see e.g. Creti and Villeneuve, 2003), or link 
the price to some external benchmark (e.g. the UK NBP price). 
 
Volume risk, or the risk that one’s output cannot be sold against market prices, is of particular concern if the number of 
potential  buyers  is  limited,  which  indeed  makes  investments  relation-specific.  Liquidity  of  the  gas  market  strongly 
decreases this specificity and the ensuing need for long-term contracts. A liquid gas market by definition is able to 
absorb gas sales at market prices. Quoting Newbery (2000) on the UK gas market, “In the past the lack of a competitive 
market for gas has meant that gas development faced the same problems of opportunism as other capital-intensive 
sunk investments tied to a single market, which they managed by signing long-term contracts. If there is a genuinely 
competitive gas market with a sufficiently large number of buyers and sellers, [...] then these problems of opportunism 
are reduced, and only commercial risks remain. Oil companies are familiar with these potential problems, and manage 
them with rather shorter-lived contracts, futures, and by shifting the remaining risks onto their shareholders who can 
hold diversified portfolios.” 
 
The fact that liquid gas markets reduce investment risk (or risk of hold-up) is illustrated by the Ormen Lange project, a 
multi-billion dollar investment connecting a Norwegian gas field to the UK market, as described by Honoré and Stern  
(2004): “Many of these companies have said on many occasions that it would be impossible to invest in multi-billion 
dollar projects without long term contracts. And yet, it is striking that although the project is under construction, no long 
term contracts have been announced and Norsk Hydro has said that it does not intend to sign any such contracts for its 
share of the gas. The only company which could use an existing contract is Statoil which has a contract with Centrica for 
5 Bcm/year for 10 years at NBP prices for delivery at that location. It appears that other sellers intend to develop a 
portfolio of long, medium and short term sales and possibly also arbitrage between UK and Continental European gas 
markets  depending  on  price  differentials.”  Stern  and  Honoré  cite  the  liquidity  of  the  UK  market  as  one  of  the 
explanations. Similarly, Newbery (2000) describes the developments of the UK market in the period 1995-1998: “The 
development of increasingly liquid spot and futures markets created a serious alternative to long-term contracts for 
producers and suppliers [...]. Contract lengths shortened, producers were encouraged to release supplies, and prices 
dropped [...].” 
 
Liquid markets may require, however, some help from policy makers to get established. Firstly, 
markets may be characterised by the existence of network externalities (see e.g. Economides 
and Siow, 1988). This means that the benefits of having a market is an increasing function of 
the number of players because the number of options for carrying out efficient transactions 
grows as the number of market players active in the market increases. As individual trading 
parties in a market are not fully able to capture these benefits, a market may therefore fail to  
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develop. Especially in the starting-up phase, a push from government may be required. This 
may take the form of active endorsement of a market place, instilling confidence in a market by 
introducing trade oversight through market surveillance committees, and stimulating 
transparency of markets, e.g. with the help of the independent system operator. Also, especially 
in more concentrated markets, policies to prevent incumbents from frustrating the development 
of liquidity by impeding retrading (e.g. through contractual clauses) of power or gas can be 
warranted. 
4.4.4  Regulation of energy mix and investment in strategic stocks 
Dependence of energy supplies on only a small number of different sources will increase the 
aggregate supply’s exposure to external risks, and hence may add to the risk of price or supply 
shocks to consumers. This risk should be weighed against the potential efficiencies of some 
sources of supply over others. As noted, generally competitive markets may achieve finding the 
efficient trade-off between these effects, as private investors and consumers internalise the 
benefits of diversification. Where either the resulting exposure to price shocks is deemed 
(politically) undesirable, or where market failures may play a role, policy measures to increase 
diversification may be sought. 
 
In some cases, the historical situation may differ sufficiently from the driving forces of 
competitive markets so that increase of diversification may be automatic. This is the case for 
example with the increase of relatively low capital-intensive gas technology in markets that 
were for historical reasons dominated by coal-fired generation technology. Furthermore, in the 
electricity market, relatively recent environmental (emissions) regulations tend to increase 
generation diversity (see Grubb et al., 2006, for projections of diversity in the UK under low 
carbon objectives). 
 
Diversification in the electricity market may also be achieved by stronger linkage of markets in 
various countries, pooling the risks of local disturbances. As such interconnection increases 
diversity, existing policy goals setting minimum bounds on interconnection capacity may be 
beneficial. Since regulatory structures may face difficulty in promoting sufficient availability of 
interconnection capacity (see below), such goals may be a second-best answer to market or 
regulatory failures associated to the natural monopoly characteristics of transmission grids. The 
risk of overinvestment should be recognised, however. Improving regulation on congestion 
management and investment would be preferable. 
 
In the gas market, diversity is probably a bigger issue, in particular concerning geopolitical 
sources of gas. In principle, those political or technological risks that are exogenous to market 
participants’ behaviour may be internalised by them. This does require that importers do face 
these risks in terms of exposure to price rises in case of incidents. In particular, force majeure  
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clauses in balancing arrangements, or the possibility of financial default against the system 
operator would undermine this internalisation and lead to overreliance by market parties on the 
risky source. 
 
However, as noted, it can well be argued that the risk of politically motivated supply restrictions 
by gas producing countries increases with the dependence of a consumer country on this source. 
In that case, there is a negative externality to procuring gas from such countries (i.e. by buying 
the producing country’s gas, a party increases the risk of supply interruptions to other 
importers), and policy measures to reduce dependence might be efficient. One such measure 
could be limiting the share of gas from individual supply countries, a measure adopted for 
example by Spain. 
 
Restricting shares of imports from individual countries may be difficult to enforce in liquid 
markets (except by directly limiting pipeline capacity), as a result of potential retrading of gas. 
This in particular is the case for shipments of LNG, that may easily change ownership. The 
costs of any such import constraints would depend on the substituting supplies. In the long-run, 
these would presumably be increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), shipped from 
diverse locations. On the other hand, direct containment of political risk through foreign policy 
is warranted (CIEP, 2004). Another viable route may be political efforts towards the reduction 
of (transaction) costs for (other) sources of gas. This could take the form of coordination of 
siting permits for transmission infrastructure, as would be the case for a planned alternative gas 
route from the Caspian region through Turkey to Europe. 
 
Other policy measures could involve investment in strategic reserves, as these would reduce the 
effect of withholding supply, and hence the risk of such actions occurring. The major risk here 
is that private initiatives are crowded out: private investors may decrease their investment by a 
similar amount of capacity. This clearly depends on the deployment criteria of the strategic 
reserves, but it would seem hard for governments to commit not to employ the strategic reserves 
in all cases where prices rise significantly, thus muting incentives for private investment. If only 
used under contingencies, a cost-benefit analysis would be called for: voluntary disconnection 
of consumers may well be a less costly alternative. As an example, IEA(2004)  notes that gas 
stocks are much more costly than oil reserves.
20  
4.4.5  Optimal regulation of grids and system operators 
The natural monopoly of transmission system operation and investment evidently requires 
regulation. In contrast to regulation of distribution grids, analysis of, and experience with 
regulation of transmission systems is still underdeveloped. A notable example that is often 
considered to be successful is that in the UK, where the independent system operator is 
 
20 See also cost-benefit analyses in De Joode et al. (2004) and Mulder et al. (2006).  
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regulated under a mix of cost of service and profit sharing mechanisms, under performance 
metrics which include quality (Joskow, 2005). Giving adequate incentives for inter-TSO 
transmission investment is a more difficult issue, however. Increasing transparency to 
stakeholders of system characteristics and computation of available capacities may be a useful 
step. 
 
Vertical integration with generation likely gives distorted incentives as system operator 
decisions may have great impact on generator profitability. Joskow (2005) argues that 
ownership unbundling is optimal. 
 
Minimum quality standards are widely used by regulators to protect customers from quality 
decreases below a certain level. In particular for distribution networks, such a standard may 
require that the company has to pay a fine or even may loose its licence for violating this 
standard. Minimum quality standards are used, for example, in the UK (Ofgem, 2003). 
 
Although minimum quality standards are effective to prevent the drop of quality below a certain 
level, they do not reward companies for the provision of a higher quality or achieving a better 
price-to-quality ratio. There have been regulatory attempts to introduce these incentives by 
adjusting regulated tariffs with change in consumer interruption cost (e.g., in Norway and the 
Netherlands, see Langset et al., 2001, and DTe 2002). That way, the regulator balances cost-
reducing incentives with incentives for a better price-to-quality ratio.  
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5  Liberalisation and environment 
5.1  Introduction 
Electricity generation is a major source of environmental pollution. Emissions from burning 
fossil fuels to produce electricity contribute substantially to urban ozone and other air pollution, 
acid deposition, regional haze and visibility problems as well as the build up of greenhouse gas 
concentration in the earth’s atmosphere. The consequences are human health problems, 
damages of ecosystems, crops, and building material, amenity losses, and global warming (cf. 
European Commission, 2003). 
 
Against this background it is important to know how increased competition in the European 
electricity markets is likely to affect the size of the environmental impact. The answer to this 
question is not obvious because restructuring can affect the environmental performance of 
electricity generation in many different ways, some leading to increases of air pollution and 
global warming and some leading to decreases. The effect depends on four key factors: how 
liberalisation affects electricity consumption, how it affects fuel efficiency, how it changes the 
mix of technology to produce electricity, and how liberalisation affects voluntary environmental 
initiatives and the performance of environmental regulation. This chapter first discusses these 
issues based on theoretical literature (Brennan et al., 2002). Afterwards, some empirical 
findings are presented both from inside and outside the EU and the results of a game theoretic 
model of the EU electricity market are outlined. 
 
Beforehand, it is important to note that in principle liberalisation does not lead to any change in 
total CO2 emissions because they are capped by the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). If the emission cap is fixed and liberalisation facilitates fuel efficiency and clean 
technologies, this will only lead to more available allowances that could be sold to other sectors 
also covered by the EU ETS. It is, however, possible that liberalisation results in a higher level 
of electricity consumption with equal CO2 emissions (see 5.3).  
5.2  Effects of liberalisation on environment 
5.2.1  Electricity consumption 
A primary motivation for more competition in the electricity market is the expectation that it 
will lead to lower electricity prices. If prices fall, the consumption of electricity and emissions 
from electricity generation can be expected to increase, though not by a large amount since 
electricity demand tends to be inelastic. Whether and how much electricity prices fall as a result 
of liberalisation depends on a number of factors. If, for instance, the new market is very 
competitive and therefore leads to more efficient production and more purchase options for all  
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classes of consumers, this can result in significantly lower electricity prices. In the short term, 
prices may also fall because overcapacities that have been produced by regulation and subsidies 
may be abolished. Conversely, if the regulated utility is a low cost supplier relative to its 
neighbours, prices in this area can actually increase under competition. Prices may also be 
higher than they would have been under regulation due to mergers and strategic behaviour of 
the electricity suppliers, as is described in chapter 3 (see also Haas et al., 2000). Thus, 
liberalisation has to be accompanied by a strong enforcement of antitrust laws. 
 
Liberalisation could also lead to greater use of real-time pricing of electricity, leading to higher 
prices during periods of peak electricity demand and lower prices during off-peak periods, 
increasing market efficiency. Consumers may decide to shift their electricity consuming 
activities to off-peak periods. As the baseload generation in many countries produces more 
emissions than the peak units because of a higher share of coal, the shift from peak to baseload 
could lead to higher emissions. In single countries that have a high share of nuclear power in the 
baseload generation, such as France, the shift could lead to lower emissions. In these cases other 
problems like nuclear waste disposal or reactor accidents may become severer.  
5.2.2  Fuel efficiency 
Rate of return regulation, that was the leading regulation in the old days of electricity 
generation, covered generators’ costs of production plus some fixed capital rent. This did not 
enhance investments into innovative energy efficient power plants. In contrast, after 
liberalisation, electricity generators economise on fuel use, as is seen in chapter 3, for example 
by improving their degree of energy cycle efficiency, because they have stronger incentives to 
reduce production costs. This could lead to reductions in primary energy use and emissions per 
produced kWh.  
5.2.3  Mix of generation technologies 
Liberalisation can have different effects on the development of nuclear generation, coal-fired 
and gas-fired generation as well as generation based on renewable energy sources. For each 
technology the effect can be theoretically either positive or negative. For example more 
competition can on the one hand lead to an increased use of relatively cheap coal-fired 
generators. On the other hand, some older coal plants will require capital investments to extend 
their lives and the costs of these investments might not be recoverable in a competitive market. 
Increasing the output of these older plants will additionally increase their maintenance costs, 
potentially making them unprofitable and thus marking them for replacement by more efficient 
plants. The chances of renewables may be affected if, as expected, increased competition leads 
to lower electricity prices and no other instruments to promote renewables are in place. 
Conversely, liberalisation creates greater possibilities for differentiating purchase options that 
can provide a boost to renewables. Incumbents as well as new operators offer service packages  
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featuring green electricity for which consumers are willing to pay a premium above the market 
price of conventional power (see also the section on dynamic efficiency). 
 
In general, whether a certain technology penetrates the European electricity markets faster than 
it would have in the absence of liberalisation is an open question, for several reasons. 
Competitive markets are riskier for investors, so that the capital costs will be higher than under 
regulation and tend to yield lower levels of investment in new generation plants. Uncertainty 
about future developments of environmental regulation, available locations for new plants, 
primary energy prices, or costs of the required equipment may have investment-reducing effects 
as well (IEA, 2003). 
5.2.4  Voluntary initiatives and environmental regulation 
More competition in the electricity market can lead to fewer utility-sponsored electricity 
conservation programs that help to slow the growth of electricity consumption. If these 
programs are actually effective in reducing electricity demand, eliminating them would result in 
higher emission levels. Liberalisation of U.S. electricity for instance has contributed to the 
demise of many utility-sponsored conservation programs. Voluntary commitments to reduce 
emissions are also less likely to be forthcoming in a more competitive market where electricity 
generators have a stronger incentive to keep costs low. 
 
Greater competition may, at the same time, improve the generators’ willingness to comply with 
some environmental regulations, provided that monitoring is effective and thus, complying 
doesn’t create competitive disadvantages. In a more deregulated market, generators are more 
concerned about minimising costs, so that the incentives to install low cost abatement 
techniques or to switch to cleaner fuels due to taxes or emissions trading are stronger. The 
advantage of market based policies relative to command-and-control methods is greater in a 
competitive than in a regulated electricity market. Market based policies are therefore seen as 
more consistent with liberalisation. Note, however, that overall efficiency comparison between 
regulated and competitive markets must include monitoring costs which tend to be higher in the 
latter case. 
5.2.5  Empirical evidence 
As the process of liberalisation in many countries is still ongoing, the existing literature doesn’t 
provide a comprehensive research on all effects. The following findings, however, present some 
impacts of liberalisation which have been observed so far. Pearson (2000) shows that 
liberalisation of the U.K. electricity market in 1989 was associated with a rapid decrease of both 
total emission of several key pollutants as well as emissions per unit of electricity generated. 
The main reason for this development was that coal was to a large extent replaced by gas. The  
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author argues that this encouraged the government to take a more proactive environmental 
stance than they would have otherwise done. 
 
Several studies analyse the effects of the market liberalisation on energy efficiency and use of 
renewables in the U.K. They conclude that liberalisation coupled with other policies helps to 
enhance energy efficiency but is in itself insufficient (e.g. Eyre, 2000; Wohlgemuth, 2000). This 
result is confirmed by the development of the demand for green electricity after liberalisation of 
the German electricity market. Only 1.2% of the electricity consumers switched from 
conventional to green electricity due to higher prices and switching costs. Thus, the diffusion of 
renewable energy technologies relies on additional promotion measures (Börner, 2002). 
 
Filippini et al. (2002) analyse the chances of the Swiss hydropower sector after the deregulation 
of the Swiss and the European electricity markets. They conclude that in the short run only a 
few producers have financial difficulties to cover operational costs and that the majority of the 
firms will not reduce or shut down their activities. The chances in the long run will depend 
crucially on the long run market price and on the capability of the producers to innovate. 
 
Eikeland (1998) compares the impacts of liberalisation of electricity markets on the 
environment in the U.K. and Norway. The short-term effects were different due to different 
initial situations. Compared to the environmental improvement after liberalisation in the U.K. 
due to an intensified use of natural gas instead of coal, the impacts in Norway have been more 
complex. In Norway, nearly all electricity had historically been generated by hydro. Shortly 
after the reform in 1990, a temporary stop in new development of hydro projects occurred, 
leading to short-term environmental improvements, because the abolition of politically set 
prices and the area franchise system revealed excessive supply capacity. More fundamental 
changes came because the reform led to increased power trade between Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark, coupling the Norwegian hydro-based electricity systems with thermal-
based systems relying on coal, gas, and nuclear power. Whether or not the trade has led to a net 
decrease in environmental damages in the whole area is not clear. With respect to the long-term 
environmental impacts, the patterns seem to have been quite similar in both countries. The new 
electricity legislation allocated the responsibility for environmental challenges to the state 
(regulator), industry, and consumers. 
 
Focussing on the climate change problem, Eikeland (1998) ascertains that after liberalisation 
regulators and industries had lower incentives to promote energy efficiency and renewables due 
to other overriding interests. Consumers were still relatively passive. He emphasised however, 
that the Swedish example of labelling green electricity led to a massive demand for green 
electricity, pushing the liberalised market towards an improved environmental performance.  
  
  63 
Fabrizio et al. (2006) examine whether liberalisation of the U.S. electricity market has increased 
the productive efficiency on the plant level. They find that investor-owned utility (IOU) plants 
in restructuring regimes reduced their labour and non-fuel operating costs by 3 to 5% relative to 
IOU plants in states that did not restructure their electricity market. The utilities in the 
restructuring regimes have therefore a greater potential to reduce electricity prices which could 
in principle lead to a higher level of electricity consumption. The authors also find little 
evidence of increases in fuel efficiency relative to plants in regulated markets, although the 
power of this test is limited due to a lack of data. Another US study, Bushnell et al. (2005), 
finds that fuel efficiency of divested plants improved by about 2%. Similar, though somewhat 
smaller, improvements were also observed at utility-owned plants in states that imposed more 
stringent regulation during the same time period. 
 
Ringel (2003) takes a closer look at the first trends of the European electricity markets after the 
liberalisation. The author states that the liberalisation does not only imply opportunities, but 
also risks for the creation of a sustainable power sector. Many risks are due to market 
distortions caused by the delay in forming a fully functional single European market. In the 
short term, market liberalisation tends to create more risks than opportunities because of lower 
end-user electricity prices which increase the cost disadvantage of renewable energies and 
combined heat and power (CHP) plants. In the long run however, the efficiency gains of the 
sector and the appearance of new actors, such as new energy service suppliers, are likely to 
bring forth the opportunities and foster a transformation towards a sustainable electricity sector. 
 
Kemfert et al. (2003) apply a game theoretic model to study the strategic behaviour of energy 
suppliers and their impacts on the environmental situation in the liberalised European electricity 
market. The effects on environment are ambiguous. Liberalisation leads, on the one hand, to an 
application of low cost technologies which are generally more damaging. On the other hand, in 
the Nordic countries that have an initially high share of renewable energy production 
technology, the share of environmentally friendly technologies is further increased.  
5.2.6  Summary 
According to both theoretical as well as empirical results, the impacts of liberalisation of the 
electricity markets on the environment are ambiguous. The overall effect on the environment 
consists of the various effects that liberalisation has on electricity consumption, mix of 
technologies, fuel efficiency, and the effectiveness of environmental regulations. According to 
the theoretical literature the single effects can be either positive or negative. The case studies of 
the U.K. and Norway show that the impacts also crucially depend on the initial situation in a 
country before liberalisation. The initial situations differ with regard to natural resources and 
geographical conditions, technological know-how, and requirements of the existing 
environmental regulation. Furthermore, the degree of market opening and the adjustment of  
  64 
environmental policy measures are crucial. For these reasons the impacts of liberalisation on the 
environment will differ across the Member States. Anyway, liberalisation is generally not 
opposed to environmental objectives and can strengthen the effect of market based 
environmental instruments.  
5.3  Effects of the European Emissions Trading Scheme on Competition 
5.3.1  Introduction 
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is by far the most important policy 
measure in the European electricity market directed at environmental concerns.
21 It was 
launched at the beginning of 2005 to control CO2 emissions of the power generation and heavy 
industry. The aim of emissions trading is to meet the emissions reduction targets at least costs. 
The cap-and-trade mechanism makes sure that those emitters reduce emissions for whom it is 
cheapest to do. The comment in the previous subsection on the positive interaction between 
market based regulation and liberalisation holds true for the EU ETS in particular. In a 
liberalised market firms minimise their costs including costs of CO2 emissions. Comparing 
allowance price and marginal abatement costs a firm decides either to reduce emissions or to 
buy allowances. The market mechanism of the EU ETS therefore achieves the efficient 
distribution of emission allowances at least information requirements for the regulator, i.e. the 
regulator does not need to know the marginal abatement costs of the emitters.  
 
The initial allocation of allowances lies with the responsibilities of the Member Sates. Some 
design elements of the allocation mechanism may risk the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
EU ETS: 
 
·  free allocation 
·  allocation rules for new entrants and closures 
·  multi-period nature of allocation (updating) 
·  non-harmonised allocation 
·  hybrid nature of allocation. 
 
This section presents a short analysis of the consequences of these features. As the EU ETS has 
been started very recently the analysis is mainly based on the results of analytic and numerical 
simulation models but also contains a limited number of empirical results. 
 
 
21 The use of other policies, such as electricity taxes or measures to promote green electricity, differs across Member States. 
They are mainly set at the national level (cf. Speck, 2003).  
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5.3.2  Free allocation 
The power companies have to reduce emissions only slightly as compared to business-as-usual 
and receive most of the emission allowances for free. Nevertheless, facing a market price of 
permits constitutes opportunity costs for the firms. Here the question comes up whether the 
opportunity costs of allowances are passed on to consumers through higher electricity prices, 
even though the allowances were allocated for free. The free allocation of allowances can be 
interpreted as lump-sum transfer to the participating companies which lower their average costs 
of CO2 emissions. In the ideal case however, competitive prices reflect marginal costs, not 
average costs. Opportunity costs are part of marginal costs so that passing on the emission 
opportunity costs is generally in line with economic theory. Due to a largely regionally traded 
good, not fully liberalised markets, and a rather inelastic demand for electricity, the power 
sector is in a very comfortable position to pass on the opportunity costs. Indeed, empirical and 
simulation model estimates for Germany and the Netherlands indicate that the share of CO2 
costs which is passed on to consumers ranges from 60 to 100% depending on market and 
technology specific factors. As a result, power companies realise substantial windfall profits 
and increase their profitability. At an allowance price of 20 €/t, the windfall profits in the Dutch 
power sector are estimated at 300 – 600 million € per year, i.e. about 3 – 5 € per MWh 
produced and sold (Sijm et al., 2006). The windfall profits constitute a competitive advantage 
vis-à-vis other sectors that also participate in the EU ETS but do not have the possibility to pass 
on the costs due to international competition. Depending on the input structure of the 
companies, they do not only face CO2 opportunity costs but also higher production costs due to 
higher electricity prices. Many electricity intensive industries, such as the aluminium industry 
that compete internationally with their goods are put at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
industries from countries without CO2 control. This problem, however, arises with any type of 
costly environmental regulation. More competition in the power sector could help to mitigate 
these distortions, though the disadvantage of internationally competing industries will probably 
persist. 
 
Independent from passing on CO2 costs, the problem of windfall profits would be mitigated, if 
allowances were, at least partly, auctioned. The literature indicates that auctioning would lead to 
higher overall efficiency regarding the optimal level of output and emissions (cf. Böhringer and 
Lange, 2005). Furthermore, auctioning provides the possibility of generating revenues which 
could be used to reduce distortionary taxes and create welfare gains (cf. Smith and Ross, 2002). 
Given that one aim of the EU ETS is the reduction of energy demand the rise of gross energy 
prices is unavoidable. Without special provisions for internationally competing and particularly 
energy intensive companies higher energy prices lead to competitive distortions. Auction, 
however, provides an instrument to redistribute windfall profits to households and the economy.  
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5.3.3  Allocation rules for new entrants and closures 
Like any other environmental regulation, the EU ETS tends to increase the costs of entry and 
therefore limits the number of potential competitors seeking to enter the market. For this reason, 
most Member States reserve allowances for new entrants and thereby, facilitate competition. 
The promotion of competition, however, may come at a cost. If the allocation depends on 
technology, i.e. carbon intensive technologies receive relatively more allowances, the choice for 
new power plants will be distorted away from CO2 efficient plants towards more CO2 intensive 
technologies
22. Although the overall emissions are capped the technology mix will then be 
inefficient. In order to create efficient investment incentives the allocation should be based on 
output independent from technology. An alternative would be the auction of allowances. More 
investments in CO2 efficient technologies tends to lower allowance prices because less 
allowances are needed for the same level of electricity output.   
 
Allocation of allowances to incumbent generators requires in some Member States that the 
power station operates a minimum number of hours or produces a minimum number of MWh 
per year. An operator then will run the power station even if the marginal production costs 
exceed the wholesale price, as long as the loss is less then the value of his allowances. As a 
result, old and unprofitable power stations that otherwise might have been replaced by new 
build power plants could stay online (Neuhoff et al. 2005). The allowance price tends to be 
higher because these operators keep the allowances instead of closing down and selling the 
allowances. As both rules for newcomers and closures vary, the incentives for new entrants and 
operators of old and unprofitable power stations also vary between Member States. 
5.3.4  Multi-period nature of allocation (updating) 
The allocation of allowances is based on historical emissions and follows a sequential process. 
Allocation plans are decided on for one trading period at a time with repeated negotiations 
about the allocation for the following periods. It is therefore likely that present emissions have 
an impact on the negotiations and therefore on future allocations. A grandfathering scheme of 
this type is likely to lead to dynamic inefficiencies. If electricity generators anticipate that their 
present behaviour affects future allowance allocations, the CO2 efficiency incentives of the EU 
ETS will be reduced because any improvement may reduce future allocations. Analytic and 
simulation models show that this strategic behaviour results in higher CO2 prices compared to 
one-off allocation. The models also predict that as electricity prices are lower, electricity 
consumption will increase (Neuhoff et al. 2006; Böhringer and Lange, 2003). A fixed reference 
date could avoid strategic behaviour because present day emissions decisions would not affect 
future allowance allocations. It is, however, questionable, whether future allocations could 
 
22 There are other policy measures to promote CO2 efficient power plants such as renewable energy sources or CHP plants. 
Note, however, that the instruments can interfere with each other and that an inefficient allocation can result. For discussion 
see Böhringer et al., 2006.  
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really be based on an old reference date, ignoring the intermediate technological change. 
Another possibility is to base allowance allocation on output or benchmarks. Output based 
allocation is independent from emissions and technology and would therefore avoid strategic 
behaviour and also create efficient investment incentives. Benchmarks compare existing 
technologies and define specific emissions levels (standards) for each technology. They could 
also help to avoid strategic behaviour but could lead to false investment incentives because they 
are not independent from technology, i.e. CO2 intensive technologies may be favoured (see 
5.3.3). Due to technological innovations benchmarking has to be repeated regularly.  
5.3.5  Non-harmonised allocation 
The amount of national emission allowances is decided by the Member States. They are, 
however, required to be on the pathway to their reduction targets from the Kyoto Protocol and 
the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, but they have discretion over what share of their overall 
emissions reduction they plan to achieve in the EU ETS sectors, in the non-participating sectors, 
or through the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. In other words the Member States 
have discretion in allocating allowances to the participating sectors. As there is no 
harmonisation across countries, there is a real risk that differences in the assignment of free 
allowances to firms could distort competition. Böhringer and Lange (2004) show that it is in 
general impossible to obtain efficient CO2 reductions when requiring 100% free allocation of 
allowances and non-discrimination of similar firms across countries. They propose a continuous 
increase of the auctioned ratio to promote harmonisation and efficiency in the longer run, 
leading the EU ETS to unfold its strength. 
 
The allocation of allowances has also to consider the existing mix of technology. A large share 
of nuclear power can help to reduce CO2 emissions but may lead to other problems such as 
nuclear waste disposal or reactor accidents. Countries with a high share of nuclear baseload 
power generation should therefore allocate fewer allowances. 
5.3.6  Hybrid nature of allocation 
The EU ETS covers almost half of all EU CO2 emissions of which two-thirds are from power 
generation. The CO2 emissions of the sectors not covered by the EU ETS are to be controlled by 
complementary policy measures. If the reduction targets from the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 
Burden Sharing Agreement are supposed to be reached mainly by national reduction efforts and 
not by using the international Kyoto mechanisms, the allocation of allowances to the EU ETS 
sectors also determines the reduction obligation for the non-participating sectors. That is, a 
generous allocation to the energy intensive EU ETS sectors implies high reduction efforts for 
the other sectors which have generally higher marginal abatement costs. Such a shift of the 
reduction burden can lead to substantial excess costs compared to a comprehensive emissions 
trading system covering all segments of the economy (Böhringer et al., 2005). Furthermore the  
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hybrid nature of the current allocation design can create distribution problems, i.e. discriminate 
against non-participating sectors that will have to bear a higher burden of abatement costs. 
5.3.7  Summary 
Some of the allocation rules favour carbon intensive investments and tend to increase the 
allowance price for a given cap in the long run. The consequence of higher CO2 prices are 
higher abatement costs to meet the reduction targets, risking the principally efficient and 
effective design of emissions trading. This could lead to competitive disadvantages for the EU 
compared the other countries with less CO2 regulation. 
 
The analysis of the EU ETS allocation mechanisms shows that various provisions are likely to 
create distortions of competition in the electricity market. This includes distortions between 
different participants, between participating and non-participating sectors within one country as 
well as between Member States.  
 
The EU ETS co-exists with the liberalisation process. The impacts on the electricity sector and 
the environment are therefore a result of their interaction. At this stage, we cannot quantify the 
overall effect. There is, however, consensus that market-based regulations are clearly more 
compatible with a liberalised environment. 
5.4  Macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in European electricity 
markets 
5.4.1  Introduction 
This section analyses the macroeconomic costs of the most important environmental policies in 
the European electricity markets, namely the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), 
electricity taxes, and measures to promote renewables. The analysis is based on selected 
simulation studies that calculate the development of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, 
employment, or welfare, after the implementation of the environmental policy measures. The 
baseline which serves as reference scenario in all simulation studies is business-as-usual.  It 
denotes the hypothetical scenario where the policy measure was never introduced and no certain 
environmental objective is installed.  
5.4.2  Theoretical background 
There are several dimensions of efficiency of environmental policies. The first dimension 
concerns efficient taxation according to optimal taxation theory and distortionary effects of 
taxes. Unless we have lump-sum transfers or completely inelastic demand for a good taxation 
will always involve dead weight welfare loss. As all three policies, EU ETS, electricity taxes,  
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and promotion of green electricity, tend to increase electricity prices
23 they create inefficiencies 
in terms of dead weight welfare loss. However, the distortionary effects of a tax on a good 
decrease with the elasticity of demand. As the demand elasticity of electricity tends to be 
relatively small dead weight welfare loss of electricity taxes and ETS is expected to be also 
small. Energy taxes can even have positive economic impacts if they replace more distortionary 
taxes on goods with higher elasticity of demand (Double Dividend). However, electricity is an 
important input factor for many goods. Therefore, higher electricity prices usually lead to 
higher product prices which in turn create inefficiencies. Furthermore, higher electricity prices 
reduce the competitiveness of firms that face international competition.  
 
Optimal taxation theory does not consider external costs of electricity generation and 
consumption. The second dimension of efficiency, therefore, concerns the design of the policy 
measures with respect to the internalisation of external costs related to electricity generation and 
consumption. Environmental policy measures, for instance, should target the fuel mix to reduce 
emissions efficiently, i.e. they should raise marginal costs of emissions rather than costs of 
electricity as a whole. In this respect, ETS is superior to taxes and standards because the 
legislator determines only the total quantity of emissions and leaves abatement decisions to the 
emitters. Efficiently set taxes and standards, in contrast, require information about marginal 
abatement costs of all emitters. Another aspect is that policy measures should principally target 
marginal costs rather than fixed costs, since these determine the actors’ decisions. That means 
that a policy measure that increases marginal costs is able to internalise external costs at lower 
macroeconomic costs than a policy that targets fixed costs.  
 
The third dimension addresses distributional effects. Electricity taxes increase costs for 
electricity consumers, i.e. households and companies, and increase government income. 
Recycling of the additional government income to the economy can disburden tax payers. 
Considering the EU ETS, the initial allocation of allowances to the participating sectors is for 
free and covers the need of the participating firms (see 5.3.2). So, at first, firms bear only CO2 
opportunity costs. If the power sector is able to pass on the CO2 opportunity costs through 
higher prices the burden is assigned to electricity consumers. The free allocation can be taken as 
a lump-sum transfer to the power sector. Hence, electricity taxes and EU ETS change the 
distribution. Both of them tend to burden electricity consumers and disburden other actors, such 
as the power sector, government, or tax payers. 
 
In this section we deal mainly with the first dimension of efficiency. Accordingly, we do not 
focus on the internalisation of external costs and distributional effects but rather on 
macroeconomic costs that arise from dead weight welfare losses and losses of international 
 
23 We observe that the power sector is in a comfortable position to pass on the CO2 opportunity costs to consumers so that 
the EU ETS is likely to increase electricity prices. See e.g. Oberndorfer and Rennings, 2006 or Sijm et al., 2006.  
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competitiveness due to increasing electricity prices. Higher electricity prices can also have 
positive impacts if they lead to the development and implementation of new energy efficient 
technologies. This effect is commonly known as the Porter Hypothesis. It says that stringent 
environmental regulations can in principal increase the competitiveness of firms, sectors and 
economies because they trigger environmentally benign innovations which may reduce 
production costs or create other competitive advantages. In addition, follower countries that also 
introduce ambitious environmental regulation may buy these new technologies (Porter and van 
der Linde, 1995; Porter, 1999).
 24  
5.4.3  Macroeconomic effects of European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The previous section, 5.3, presented the implications of the design of the EU ETS for 
competition and efficient investment decisions. In this section we describe the impact on 
welfare and other macroeconomic variables. The impact is on the one hand due to the hybrid 
regulation principle of the EU ETS. The segments of the economy that do not participate in the 
EU ETS have to be regulated by complementary domestic policies. On the other hand the 
inclusion of the international flexible mechanisms from the Kyoto Protocol plays an important 
role. The Kyoto target can be achieved by emissions reductions in the ETS sector as well as in 
the non-ETS sector. Furthermore, countries can decide to buy carbon credits in the framework 
of the international flexible mechanisms from the Kyoto Protocol, namely the international 
Emissions Trading, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). 
CDM and JI projects can also be used by ETS firms in order to comply with their allowance 
endowment. 
 
Oberndorfer and Rennings (2006) review the results of various simulation studies in order to 
assess the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS. They find small negative effects on the 
sectoral and macroeconomic level, if the baseline is business-as-usual. The losses in most 
sectors are modest except for the aluminium sector with its particular competitive situation, 
very limited options to reduce electricity consumption, and hence profits highly dependent on 
electricity prices.  
 
Klepper and Peterson (2005) employ the computable general equilibrium model DART to 
assess the effects of the EU ETS in the year 2012 when the Kyoto targets will have to be met. 
The baseline is business-as-usual that keeps all climate policy measures introduced until the 
year 2002 in place but does not include any new climate policies. The simulation includes the 
actual NAP of each EU15 Member State for the first trading period 2005 to 2007. The use of 
 
24 The inclusion of innovations and technological progress in economic modeling is still at the beginning. So most simulation 
models set technological progress as an exogenous variable and therefore cannot testify to the Porter Hypothesis (cf. 
Löschel, 2002; Goulder, 2004). Many empirical studies, however, that analyse the Porter Hypothesis do not find a significant 
correlation between environmental regulation and competitiveness, neither positive nor negative. For literature surveys, see 
for example Jaffe et al. (1995), Jenkins (1998), Taistra (1999), or Kaiser and Schulze (2003).  
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CDM and JI is unrestricted for the ETS sectors but the government purchases are restricted to 
the existing official plans. For the emissions reductions in the non-ETS sectors a uniform but 
regionally differentiated CO2 tax is assumed. The implementation of the EU ETS leads to a 
welfare loss of 0.9% compared to the business-as-usual baseline. Without the use of CDM and 
JI the welfare loss would rise to 1.7%. 
 
Peterson (2006) applies the same model to assess the effects of the NAPs for the second trading 
period 2008 to 2012. The baseline is business-as-usual without any climate policy measure 
enacted after 2001. It is assumed that both the ETS and the non-ETS sector contribute a 
proportionate share in order to achieve the Kyoto target. The governmental purchases of 
international carbon credits are restricted to existing official plans. They do not increase the 
allowances allocation to the ETS sector and therefore reduce the reduction burden of the non-
ETS sector. The reduction target for the non-ETS sector in each country is achieved through a 
uniform CO2 tax. The purchases of CDM and JI credits by the ETS firms altogether are 
restricted to 8% of total allowances in the EU ETS. The welfare loss vis-à-vis the baseline 
amounts to 1.1%. The analysis of other policy scenarios with different allowances allocations 
for the second trading period shows that the welfare loss would be considerably greater if more 
of the reduction burden were shifted from the ETS to the non-ETS sector. 
5.4.4  Macroeconomic effects of electricity taxes 
Most Member States have implemented electricity taxes. The level of taxes differs substantially. 
In order to avoid loss of competitiveness most Member States, especially those with relatively 
high tax levels, offer tax exemptions or rebates for the electricity intensive industry as well as 
recycling of tax revenues, e.g. through cutting other taxes. For this reason the existing tax 
schemes have only small impacts on the macroeconomic level.
25 
 
On the EU level, the EU Directive 2003/96/EC on the harmonisation of energy taxation defines 
minimum tax rates between 0.5 and 1 €/MWh for all energy products, namely coal, oil, gas, and 
electricity. It contains a number of general and Member specific exemptions and transitional 
periods particularly for the new Member States. The changes of national energy taxation due to 
the EU Directive differ between the Member States. The impacts on tax rates are generally low 
for most of the EU15 countries because the minimum tax rates are not very high relative to 
existing rates. The directive leads to more important changes in some southern countries, such 
as Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and in most new Member States. 
 
Kohlhaas et al. (2004) investigate the economic effects of the EU directive by means of the 
CGE model GTAP-E. They assume that all EU25 countries fulfil the minimum tax rates and all 
 
25 See for example Kohlhaas (2005) for an analysis of the German Eco-tax and Agnolucci et al. (2005) for an analysis of the 
British Climate Change Levy.  
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countries with higher tax rates hold them on the higher level. The additional tax revenue is 
allocated to government spending, private consumption, and private savings in the same 
proportions as total spending in the initial situation. The baseline is business-as-usual as if the 
EU directive had never been introduced. The effects on the national GDPs are very small. They 
range from – 0.01 to – 0.18% for those countries which need to substantially increase their 
energy taxes, namely the new Member States, because the increase in energy taxes reduces 
energy use and therefore reduces the productivity of the other production factors. The effects in 
the other countries are negligible. The CO2 emissions decrease in all Member States, 
particularly in the new Member States. 
 
Kouvaritakis et al. (2003) apply the general equilibrium model GEM-E3 to analyse the impacts 
of an energy tax scheme in the EU15. The baseline is business-as-usual including existing 
energy taxes levied for climate change in some Member States. Three policy scenarios are 
investigated: minimum energy tax rates corresponding approximately to the EU Directive, a 
more climate friendly energy tax scheme that better reflects the carbon content of each energy 
product, and the EU minimum energy taxation when the Kyoto target is fulfilled by EU ETS 
and a domestic carbon tax. Tax revenues are directly recycled through a decrease of social 
security contributions (Double Dividend). The introduction of minimum energy tax rates 
reduces CO2 emissions by 0.5% vis-à-vis business-as-usual. The overall impacts on GDP, 
employment, and welfare are nearly zero because the induced price increase is very small. In 
the case of the more climate friendly energy taxation CO2 emissions are reduced by 2.7%. The 
effects on GDP (0.02%) and welfare (0.06%) are slightly positive because the induced price 
increase is still limited and the negative effects are compensated by reducing the labour cost 
through the reduction of social security contributions. As the CO2 constraint is stronger in the 
third policy scenario, the economic impacts become negative. GDP decreases by 0.09% and 
welfare by 0.5%. The negative effects are however limited by the efficient design of the EU 
ETS and the tax revenue recycling strategy.  
 
These results are confirmed by a more recent study based on the same model (Kouvaritakis et 
al., 2005) which analyses the impacts of an energy tax scheme in the enlarged EU.
26 The 
baseline is business-as-usual with minimum tax rates of the EU Directive or national tax rates 
(if they are higher) applying in the EU15. In the new Member States only the current tax rates 
apply regardless of whether they are higher than the minimum tax rates or not. As before, three 
policy scenarios are considered: the introduction of the EU minimum energy tax rates in the 
new Member States, the EU-wide implementation of a more climate friendly tax, and the EU 
minimum energy taxation when the Kyoto target is fulfilled by EU ETS and a domestic carbon 
 
26 For numbers see table 5.1 in the conclusion.  
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tax. The overall economic effects as well as the effects on CO2 emissions are minor in the case 
of EU minimum energy taxation or the more climate friendly energy taxation. The impacts on 
the EU economy are negative if the Kyoto target is to be achieved. An efficient initial allocation 
of emission allowances and tax revenues recycling can limit these negative effects.  
5.4.5  Macroeconomic effects of promotion of renewable energy sources 
According to the EU Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources, 22% of electricity consumption is to be produced from renewables in 
2010, compared to 14% in 1997. In consideration of the national targets of the ten new Member 
States the collective objective of the EU25 decreases to 21%. The EU Directive does not 
specify any particular instruments in order to achieve the targets but rather leaves the 
responsibility for the implementation of appropriate measures with the Member States. The 
analysis of the policies and measures currently in place in the EU15 shows that they will 
probably achieve a share of only 18 – 19% in 2010. Only Denmark, Germany, Spain, and 
Finland are on track whereas the remaining countries in the EU15 have to implement further 
measures to reach their targets (European Commission 2004). A longer term target, stated in at 
the Renewables Conferences in 2004 in Berlin and Bonn, is a 20% share of renewable energy 
sources in primary energy consumption in 2020.  
 
The dominating support system in the EU15 are feed-in tariffs which exist for instance in 
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The second important support system are quota 
obligations associated with a system of tradable green certificates (TGC) which exist for 
instance in the U.K., Sweden or Italy. Feed-in tariffs are specific prices for green electricity, 
normally set for a fixed-term period, which electricity companies have to pay to producers of 
green electricity. The prices are typically differentiated by the type of renewables source, e.g. 
hydropower, wind, biomass, and solar. The additional costs of electricity generation due to a 
larger use of renewables are usually passed on to power consumers by premiums on end-user 
prices. In the case of a TGC system electricity consumers are required to purchase a certain 
share of green electricity, i.e. green certificates, according to their electricity consumption. 
Alternatively producers can be obliged to produce a certain share of green electricity according 
to their production. In order to exploit the cheapest possibilities consumers or producers are free 
to trade the green certificates between each other. Thus, in addition to the power market there 
exists a market for green certificates.  
 
The CASCADE MINTS project of the EU (Uyterlinde et al., 2004 and 2005) contains three 
CGE models, namely NEMESIS, PACE, and NEWAGE-W, which assess the economic 
impacts of a high penetration of renewables in the electricity sector. The models show the 
consequences of increasing the share of green electricity up to roughly 30% by 2020, which 
corresponds to the long term EU target of 20% renewable energy sources in primary energy  
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consumption. Similar to a TGC system, the 30% target is achieved through a quota financed by 
either endogenous uniform subsidies or potentially higher electricity prices. The baseline in all 
simulation models is business-as-usual including all policy instruments existent by the end of 
2003 and a moderate carbon tax from 2012 onward, representing future European climate 
policy. The NEMESIS model assumes uniform subsidies from 2005 to 2020 in order to meet 
the 30% target. The subsidies are passed on to consumers through higher electricity prices. The 
impacts on macroeconomic indicators for the EU15 are negative. By the end of the simulation 
period in 2020 both GDP and private consumption decrease by about 0.2%, employment 
decreases by 0.15% compared to the baseline. In the PACE model, the 30% quota on renewable 
electricity production is also achieved through an endogenous uniform subsidy. The result is a 
relatively modest welfare loss for the EU15 ranging from 0.03% in 2010 to 0.08% in 2020. In 
the NEWAGE-W model the introduction of the 30% quota results in substantially higher 
electricity prices and higher product prices. The GDP loss of the EU15 amounts to 0.3% in 
2010 and 0.8% in 2020. 
5.4.6  Summary 
Table 5.1 summarises the results. Due to differences in models and assumptions the results 
cannot be compared directly with each other. Nevertheless, we observe some tendencies. The 
economic impacts are likely to be small if the environmental effects are also small. In contrast, 
the achievement of more ambitious environmental objectives would lead to higher costs. The 
economic effects tend to be small, and in some cases even positive, if tax revenues are recycled 
to the economy. The economic implications of the EU ETS depend on the division of the 
reduction burden between the ETS sector and the Non-ETS sector as well as the inclusion of the 
international Kyoto mechanisms. Note that we consider only effects on the macroeconomic 
level. The impacts may be severe on the sector or firm level. 
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Table 5.1  Environmental effects and macroeconomic costs of EU ETS, energy taxes, and promotion of 
renewables in relation to business-as-usual baseline 












DART  EU ETS  EU15  2012  Kyoto compliance  Welfare – 0.9% 
 
 
Peterson 2006  DART  EU ETS  EU25  2012  Kyoto compliance  Welfare – 1.1% 
 
Kohlhaas et al. 
2004 
GTAP-E  Energy tax  EU 25  2004  CO2 reductions  
in all MS from  
– 0.04 % to –  3.23 % 
GDP reductions  
in a few MS from  




GEM-E3  Energy tax  EU15  2010  CO2 – 0.5% 
 
 




GDP +/– 0% 
Welfare + 0.01% 
 
GDP + 0.02% 
Welfare + 0.02% 
 
GDP – 0.09% 




GEM-E3  Energy tax  EU25  2010  CO2 – 0.5% 
 







GDP + 0.01% 
Welfare + 0.03% 
 
GDP – 0.10% 
Welfare – 0.13% 
 
NEMESIS  Promotion of 
renewables 
EU15  2020  30% green electricity  GDP – 0.2% 
Employment – 0.15% 
 
PACE  Promotion of 
renewables 
EU15  2020  30% green electricity  Welfare – 0.08% 
 
 
Uyterlinde et al. 
2004 and 2005 
NEWAGE-W  Promotion of 
renewables 
EU15  2020  30% green electricity  GDP – 0.8% 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
The theoretical and empirical literature indicates that liberalisation triggers many effects which 
can be either positive or negative for environmental quality. This includes effects of 
liberalisation on electricity consumption, fuel efficiency, technology mix, and environmental  
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regulation. The comparison between Norway and the U.K. points furthermore that the effects 
differ across EU Member States due to different initial situations and different developments of 
liberalisation and environmental regulation. Principally, liberalisation is not opposed to 
environmental objectives and can strengthen the effect of market based environmental 
instruments which aim to reach environmental objectives in a cost efficient way. 
 
The second and third part of the chapter study the economic effects of the most important 
environmental policy measures in European electricity markets, namely EU ETS, electricity 
taxes, and measures to promote green electricity. The implications for welfare or other 
macroeconomic variables depend on both the underlying environmental target and the design of 
the instruments. Considering the EU ETS which has been in the focus of our analysis, the 
division of the reduction requirement between ETS sectors, non-ETS sectors, and reductions 
abroad plays an important role. Furthermore the design of allowances allocation rules is a 
critical factor with regard to efficient investment incentives and long term macroeconomic 
costs. Even though emissions trading is generally an effective and efficient instrument the 
literature indicates that the EU ETS in its current form is far from perfect and many design 




  77 
References 
Agnolucci, P., D. Anthony, T. Barker, P. Ekins, B. Etheridge, B. Gardiner, S. Junankar, O. 
Lofsnaes, and J. Stenning , 2005, Modelling the Initial Effects of the Climate Change Levy, 
University of Cambridge and the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). 
Allaz, B., Vila, J.L. 1993 Cournot competition, futures markets and efficiency, Journal of 
economic theory, vol. 59, no. 1, pp 1-16. 
 
Batlle, C., C. Vázquez, M. Rivier and I. J. Pérez-Arriaga, 2006, A regulatory instrument to 
enhance security of suply in the Spanish wholesale electricity market, IIT Working Paper IIT-
06-025A.  
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell and F. Wolak, 2000, Diagnosing market power in California’s 
deregulated wholesale electricity market, PWP-064, University of California Energy Institute, 
US. 
 
Böhringer, C. and A. Lange, 2003, On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for 
Emission Allowances, ZEW Discussion Paper 03-08. 
 
Böhringer, C. and A. Lange, 2004, Mission Impossible!? On the Harmonisation of National 
Allocation Plans under the EU Emissions Trading Directive, ZEW Discussion Paper 04-15. 
 
Böhringer, C. and A. Lange, 2005, Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes 
for Emission Allowances, Scandinavian Journal of Economics , vol. 107, no. 3, 2005. 
 
Böhringer, C., T. Hoffmann, A. Lange, A. Löschel, and U. Moslener, 2005, Assessing Emission 
Regulation in Europe: An Interactive Simulation Approach, The Energy Journal, vol. 26 , no.4. 
 
Böhringer, C., H. Koschel, and U. Moslener, Efficiency Losses from Overlapping Economic 
Instruments in European Carbon Emissions Regulation, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 06-018, 
Mannheim, 2006. 
 
Börner, K., 2002, Die Folgen der Strommarktliberalisierung für regenerative Energiequellen, 
Wirtschaftsdienst 2002, 1. 
 
Brennan, T. J., K. L. Palmer, and S. A. Martinez, 2002, Alternating Currents – Electricity 
Markets and Public Policy, Washington DC. 
  
  78 
Brunekreeft, G., 2005, Voorzieningszekerheid op de Nederlandse stroommarkt, TILEC report, 
Tilburg, July. 
Brunekreeft, G., K. Neuhoff and D. M. Newbery, 2004, Electricity transmission: an overview of 
the current debate, Cambridge, CMI Working paper 60.   
 
Burns, P. en T. Weyman-Jones, 1996, Cost Functions and Cost Efficiency in Electricity 
Distribution: A Stochastic Frontier Approach, in: Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell 
Publishing, , vol. 48, no.1, pp. 41-64. 
 
Bushnell, J., 2004, California’s Electricity Crisis: a Market Apart?, Energy Policy, vol. 32, pp. 
1045-1052. 
 
Bushnell, J., 2005, Electricity Resource Adequacy: Matching Policies and Goals, CSEM WP 
146. 
 
Bushnell, J. and C. Saravia, 2002, An empirical assessment of the competitiveness of the New 
England electricity markets, CSEM WP-101, University of California Energy Institute, US.  
 
Bushnell, J. and C. Wolfram, 2005, Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency: The 
Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants, SCEM WP 140, US. 
 
Bye, T., 2003, A Nordic Energy Market under Stress, Economic Survey 4, 2003. 
 
Canoy, M. and D. Newbery, 2003, Fusie Controle Voldoet Niet bij Elektriciteit, Het 
Financieele Dagblad, January 18, 2003. 
 
Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), 2004, Study on Energy Supply Security 
and Geopolitics, Report for DG-TREN, January 2004. 
 
CPB, 2004, Better safe than sorry?, CPB Document 73, December 2004. 
 
Creti, A., B. Villeneuve, 2003, Long-term contracts and take-or-pay clauses in natural gas 
markets, University of Toulouse working paper. 
 
Skytte, K. and S. Ropenus, 2005, Regulatory Review and International Comparison of EU-15 
Member States, DG-Grid project. 
  
  79 
Domah P. en M. Pollitt, 2001, The Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution 
and Supply Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, Fiscal Studies, 
vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 107-146. 
 
DTe, 2002, Yardstick Competition, Regional Electricity Network Companies, Second 
Regulation Period, Information and Consultation Document. 
 
DTe, 2004, Onderzoek Ontwikkeling Liquiditeit Elektriciteitsmarkt 2003-2004. 
 
Economides, N. and A. Siow, 1988, The division of markets is limited by the extent of 
liquidity, The American Economic Review , vol. 78, no. 1, pp 108-121. 
Edvardsen, D.F., F. R. Førsund, 2003, International benchmarking of electricity distribution 
utilities, Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 25, no. 4, pp.353-371. 
Eikeland P. O., 1998, Electricity market liberalisation and environmental performance: Norway 
and the U.K., Energy Policy, vol. 26, no. 12, pp. 917-927. 
 
Eikmeier, B., J. Gabriel, and W. Pfaffenberger, 2005, Perspektiven für die energieintensive 
Industrie im europäischen Strommarkt unter Berücksichtigung der Regulierungsentgelte, 
Gutachten des Bremer  Energie Instituts für die RWE Aktiengesellschaft, Bremen. 
 
Electrabel Nieuwsbrief, 2005, “Brinkhorst: Van Duyne boekt vooruitgang in gesprekken met 
stroomproducenten”, Nieuwsbrief E-ditie Grootzakelijk , 45, 2005. 
 
Ernst & Young, 2006, Final report on the research project on “The case for liberalisation“ of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the UK. 
 
Eurelectric, 2003, R&D in EURELECTRIC Countries; overview of R&D organisation, 2002, 
update, January. 
 
European Commission, 2000, Green Paper: Towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply, Brussels, 29.11.2000, COM(2000) 769 final. 
 
European Commission, 2003, External Costs, Research results on socio-environmental damages 
due to electricity and transport, Brussels. 
 
European Commission, 2004, The share of renewable energy in the EU, Communication from 
the Commission, COM (2004) 366 final.  
  80 
 
European Commission, 2005, Report on Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity 
Market, Technical Annex. 
 
European Commission, 2006, Energy Sector Inquiry, sector inquiry under Art 17 Regulation 
1/2003 on the gas and electricity markets, preliminary report, February. 
 
European Transmission System Operators (ETSO), 2004, Overview of congestion management 
methods - Sept 2004. 
 
European Transmission System Operators (ETSO), 2006, Overview of congestion management 
methods - May 2006. 
 
European Union, 2001, Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in 
the internal electricity market, Official Journal of the European Union 27.10.2001. 
 
European Union, 2003, Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the 
Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, Official Journal of 
the European Union 31.10.2003. 
 
Eurostat, 2005, Competition indicators in the gas market of the European Union, Statistics in 
Focus, 08/2005. 
 
Eurostat, 2006, European electricity market indicators of the liberalisation process 2004-2005, 
Statistics in Focus, 6/2006. 
 
Eyre, N., 2000, Retail Market Liberalisation and Energy Efficiency: A Golden Age or a False 
Dawn?, in: MacKerron G. and P. Pearson (Eds.), The International Energy Experience – 
Markets, Regulation and the Environment. 
 
Fabrizio, K., N. Rose, C. Wolfram, 2006, Does Competition Reduce Costs? Assessing the 
Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on U.S. Electric Generation Efficiency, working paper,  
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/wolfram/Papers/frw.041306.pdf  
 
Fertilizer Institute, 2005, Testimony of Ford B. West, President, The Fertilizer Institute Before 
the U.S. Senate Appropriations Interior and Related Agencies Subcommittee Regarding The 
High Price of Natural Gas and its Impact on the U.S. Fertilizer Industry, October 2005. 
  
  81 
Filippini, M., S. Banfi, and C. Luchsinger, 2002, Deregulation of the Swiss Electricity Industry: 
Implication for the Hydropower Sector, CEPE Working Paper Nr. 13. 
 
Frontier Economics, 2006a, Current prices, anybody?, Bulletin February 2006. 
 
Frontier Economics, 2006b, Addressing the adverse effects of market power, a final report 
prepared for CREG. 
Gilbert, R., K. Neuhoff and D. M. Newbery, 2004, Allocating transmission to mitigate market 
power in electricity networks, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34. 
 
Giulietti, M., C. Waddams Price and M. Waterson, 2005, Consumer Choice and Competition 
Policy: a Study of UK Energy Markets, Economic Journal, vol. 115, no. 506, pp. 949-969. 
 
Glachant, J-M. and V. Pignon, 2003, Nordic Electricity Congestion’s Arrangement as a Model 
for Europe: Physical Constraints or Operators’ Opportunity, DAE Working Paper WP313.  
 
Glachant, J-M. and F. Lévêque, 2006, Electricity Internal Market in the European Union: What 
to do Next?, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, CWPE 0623 and EPRG 0605. 
 
Goulder, L. H., 2004, Induced Technological Change and Climate Policy, Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change. 
 
Green, R., 2003, Retail Competition and Electricity Contracts, Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics CWPE 0406, UK. 
 
Grubb, M. and K. Neuhoff, 2006, Allocation and Competitiveness in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Policy Overview, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, CWPE 0645 and EPRG 
0622. 
 
Grubb, M., L. Butler and G. Sinden, 2006, Diversity and Security in UK Electricity Generation: 
The Influence of Low Carbon Objectives, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics CWPE 
511.  
 
Haas, R., H. Auer, C. Huber, and W. Orasch, 2000, How will Electricity Prices in Deregulated 
Markets Develop in the Long Run? Arguments why there won’t be any really Cheap Electricity, 
in: MacKerron G. and P. Pearson (Eds.), 2000, The International Energy Experience – Markets, 
Regulation and the Environment.  
  82 
 
Haffner, R.C.G. en P. Meulmeester, 2005, Evaluatie van de regulering van het 
elektriciteitsnetwerk, ESB, vol. 90, no. 4472, pp. 430-433. 
 
Hattori, T., 2006, Liberalization and R&D in Japanese electricity industry - an initial 
observation of patent data, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Japan. 
Hattori, T., T. Jamasb, M. Pollitt, 2003, A comparison of UK and Japanese electricity 
distribution performance 1985-1998: lessons for incentive regulation, DAE WP 0212/CMI WP 
03. 
 
Herguera, I., 2000, Bilateral contracts and the spot market for electricity: some observations on 
the British and the NordPool experiences, Utilities Policy, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 73-80. 
High Level Group on Competitiveness, energy and the environment, 2006, Functioning of the 
energy market, access to energy , energy. First report, June 2006. 
 
Hjalmarsson, L and A. Veiderpass, 1992, Efficiency and Ownership in Swedish electricity retail 
distribution, Journal of productivity analysis, 3, pp.7-23. 
 
Hogan, W.W., 1992, Contract networks for electric power transmission, Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 4, pp 211–42. 
 
Hogan, W.W., 2005, On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy. 
 
Honoré A and J. Stern, 2004, Large Scale Investments in Liberalised Gas Markets: The Case of 
UK, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2003, Power Generation Investment in Electricity Markets. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2004, Natural Gas Information. Paris. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2005a, Lessons from Liberalised Electricity Markets, Paris. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2005b, Learning from the Blackouts, Paris. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2005c, Energy Policies in IEA Countries, 2005 Review, 
Paris. 
  
  83 
Jaffe, A. B., S. R. Peterson, P. R. Portney, and R. N. Stavins, 1995, Environmental Regulation 
and the Competitiveness of the U.S. Manufacturing: What does the Evidence Tell Us? Journal 
of Economic Literature 33, 132-163. 
 
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt, 2005a, Electricity market reform in the European Union: review of 
progress towards liberalisation and integration, CMI WP 66 and CWPE 0471, Cambridge 
University, UK.  
 
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt, 2005b, Deregulation and R&D in network industries: the case of the 
electricity industry, CWPE 0533 and EPRG 02. 
 
Jenkins, R., 1998, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness: A review of 
Literature and Some European Evidence, United nations University, Institute for new 
technologies, Discussion paper Series 9801, Maastricht. 
 
Joode, J. de, D. Kingma, M. Lijesen, M. Mulder and V. Shestalova, 2004, Energy policies and 
risks on energy markets; a cost-benefit analysis, CPB, The Hague, Special Publication 51. 
 
Joskow, P., 2003, The difficult transition to competitive electricity markets in the U.S., The 
Cambridge-MIT Institute, CMI-Working Paper 28. 
 
Joskow, P., 2005, Patterns of Transmission Investment, Electricity Infrastructure Investment 
Workshop, CRE, Paris, March 2005. 
 
Joskow, P., and J. Tirole, 2000, Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power 
Networks, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 31. 
 
Joskow, P., and J. Tirole, 2004, Retail Electricity Competition, mimeo, MIT and IDEI. 
 
Joskow, P. and J. Tirole, 2006, Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets, forthcoming in 
RAND Journal of Economics. 
 
Kaiser, K. and G. G. Schulze, 2003, International Competition and Environmental 
Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from Indonesian Manufacturing Plants, HWWA Discussion 
Paper 222, Hamburg. 
 
Kemfert, C., W. Lise, and R. Östling, 2003, The European Electricity Market – Does 
Liberalisation Bring Cheaper and Greener Electricity?, University of Oldenburg. 
  
  84 
Klepper, G. and S. Peterson (2005), Emissions Trading, CDM, JI, and More – The Climate 
Strategy of the EU, Kieler Working Paper No. 1238, Kiel. 
 
Kohlhaas, M., 2005, Gesamtwirtschaftliche Effekte der ökologischen Steuerreform, 
Forschungsprojekt im Auftrag des Umweltbundesamtes, FKZ 204 41 194, Berlin. 
 
Kohlhaas, M., K. Schumacher, J. Diekmann, D. Schumacher, and M. Cames, 2004, Economic, 
Environmental and International Trade Effects of the EU Directive on Energy Tax 
Harmonisation, DIW Discussion Papers 462, Berlin. 
 
Koschel, H., 2002, A CGE Analysis of the Employment Double Dividend-Hypothesis: 
Substitution Patterns in Production, Foreign Trade, and Labour Market Imperfections. 
Dissertation, University of Heidelberg (http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/1839 visited on 
21.08.06). 
 
Kouvaritakis, N., L. Paroussos, and D. Van Regemorter, 2003, The macroeconomic evaluation 
of energy tax policies within the EU, with the GEM-E3-Europe model, Final Report of the 
Study for the European Commission, TAXUD/2002/DE/302. 
 
Kouvaritakis, N., N. Stroblos, and L. Paroussos, 2005, Impacts of Energy Taxation in the 
enlarged European Union – Evaluation with GEM-E3 Europe, Final Report of the Study for the 
European Commission, TAXUD/2003/DE/308. 
 
Kumbhakar, S. C. and L. Hjalmarsson, 1998, Relative performance of public and private 
ownership under yardstick competition: electricity retail distribution, European Economic 
Review, vol. 42, no.1, pp. 97-122. 
 
Kühn K.-U. and M.Machado, 2004, Bilateral market power and vertical integration in the 
Spanisch electricity spot market, CEMFI WP-0414, Madrid, Spain. 
 
Langset, T., Trengereid, F., Samdal, K. and J. Heggset, 2001, Quality Dependent Revenues - 
Incentive Regulation of Quality of Supply, NVE, Norway. 
 
Lijesen, M. and G.T.J. Zwart, 2005, Op zoek naar een onzichtbaar vangnet; hoe geven we de 
publieke rol in leveringszekerheid vorm zonder de markt te verstoren?, CPB, The Hague, CPB-
Document 89. 
 
Littlechild, S., 2005, Competition and Contracts in the Nordic electricity markets, CWPE 0550 
and EPRG 06.  
  85 
 
Littlechild, S., 2006, Beyond regulation, CWPE 0616 and EPRG 0516. 
 
Löschel, A., 2002, Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental Policy: A 
Survey, Ecological Economics 43, 105-126. 
 
Mansur, E.T., 2001, Pricing behaviour in the initial summer of the restructured wholesale  
electricity market, PWP-083, University of California Energy Institute, US. 
 
Mansur, E.T., 2003, Vertical Integration in restructured electriity markets: measuring market 
efficiency and firm conduct, WP 32, Yale School of Management, US. 
 
Markard, J. and B. Truffer, 2006, Innovation processes in large technical systems: Market 
liberalization as a driver for radical change, Research Policy. 
 
Meade, R., 2006, Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity 
Systems, The European Power Supply Industry, Forthcoming.  
 
Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 2005, Thierry Breton et François Loos 
prennent acte de l'avis du Conseil de la Concurrence sur le dispositif de consortium pour les 
électrointensifs, Communiqué de presse 06/12/2005. 
 
Mork, K. A., 1992, Productivity in Swedish Electricity Retail Distribution: Comment, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94(0), pp S207-09, Supplement. 
 
Müsgens, F., 2004, Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market, EWI WP 04.03, 
University of Cologne, Germany. 
 
Mulder, M., V. Shestalova and M. Lijesen, 2005, Vertical separation of the energy-distribution 
industry: An assessment of several options for unbundling, CPB Document 84, The 
Netherlands. 
 
Mulder, M. and G.T.J. Zwart, 2006, Government involvement in liberalised gas markets; a 
welfare-economic analysis of the Dutch gas-depletion policy, CPB, The Hague, CPB-Document 
110. 
 
NERA, 2002, Security in Gas and Electricity Markets, Report for Department of Trade and 
Industry, October 2002. 
  
  86 
Neuhoff, K., 2003, Integrating Transmission and Energy Markets Mitigates Market Power, 
DAE Working Paper WP 0310.  
 
Neuhoff, K., M. Grubb, and K. Keats, 2005, Impact of the Allowance Allocation on Prices and 
Efficiency, CWPE 0552 and EPRG 08. 
 
Neuhoff, K., K. Keats Martinez, and M. Sato, 2006, Allocation, Incentives and Distortions: The 
Impact of the EU ETS Emissions Allowance Allocations to the Electricity Sector, CWPE 0642 
and EPRG 0618. 
 
Neuhoff, K. and P. Twomey, 2005, Market Power and Technological Bias: The Case of 
Electricity Generation, EPRG Working Paper 01, August 2005. 
 
Newbery, D. en M. Pollitt, 1997, The Restructuring and Privatisation of the CEGB – Was It 
Worth It?, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 45, no.3, pp. 269-303. 
 
Newbery, D. M., 2000, Privatization, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities, Walras-
Pareto Lectures, MIT Press. 
 
Newbery, D.M., 2002a, Issues and Options for Restructuring Electricity Supply Industries, 
University of Cambridge, CMI Working Paper 01. 
 
Newbery, D.M., 2002b, Regulatory Challenges to European Electricity Liberalisation, 
University of Cambridge, CMI Working Paper 12. 
 
Newbery, D.M., 2005, Capacity markets and capacity prices, presentation at The Economics of 
Electricity Markets conference, Toulouse. 
 
Oberndorfer, U. and K. Rennings, 2006, The Impacts of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme on Competitiveness in Europe, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 06-051, Mannheim. 
 
Ofgem, 2003, 2001/2002 Electricity distribution and quality of supply report. 
 
Oren, S., 2005, Generation Adequacy via Call Option Obligations: Safe Passage to the 
Promised Land, Electricity Journal, November 2005. 
 
Pearson, P. 2000, Electricity Liberalisation, Air Pollution and Environmental Policy in the 
U.K., in: MacKerron G. and P. Pearson (Eds.), 2000, The International Energy Experience – 
Markets, Regulation and the Environment.  
  87 
 
Pérez-Arriaga, J. I., 1999, Reliability in the new market structure (part 1): Reliability and 
generation adequacy, IEEE Power Engineering Review, December 1999. 
 
Peterson, S., 2006, Efficient Abatement in Separated Carbon Markets: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Kieler Working Paper No. 1271, 
Kiel. 
 
Pollitt, M.G. and Jamasb, T., 2001, Benchmarking and Regulation of Electricity Distribution 
and Transmission Utilities: Lessons from International Experience, December, DAE Working 
Paper No.0101. Cambridge University, UK.  
 
Pomp, M., Shestalova, V. and L. Rangel, 2005, Switch on the competition: causes, 
consequences and policy implications of consumer switching costs, CPB Document 97.  
 
Porter, M. E., 1999, Nationale Wettbewerbsvorteile, in: Porter, M. E. (Ed.), Wettbewerb und 
Strategie, München, 165-206. 
 
Porter, M. E. and C. van der Linde, 1995, Towards a new Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (4), 97-118.  
 
Ringel, Marc, 2003, The Common European Market for Energy and the Environment: Towards 
a Sustainable Electricity Provision? Chemnitz Working Paper 55, pp. 1-23. 
 
Sanyal, P. and L.R. Cohen, 2005, Deregulation, restructuring and changing R&D paradigms in 
the US electric utility industry, Brandeis University/University of Southern California Law 
School, February. 
 
Sijm, J., K. Neuhoff, and Y. Chen, 2006, CO2 Cost Pass Through and Windfall Profits in the 
Power Sector, CWPE 0639 and EPRG 0617. 
 
Smith, A. and M. Ross, 2002, Allowance Allocation, who Wins and Loses Under a Carbon 
Dioxide Control Program? Study of Charles River Associates. 
 
Speck, S., 2003, Liberalisation of the Electricity Market and Environmental Policy Issues: 
Synergy or Controversy, Research Symposium European Electricity Markets, The Hague. 
 
Steiner, F., 2001, Regulation, Industry Structure and Performance in the Electricity Supply 
Industry, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, nr. 238, OECD Publishing.  
  88 
 
Stern, J., 2003, UK Gas Security: time to get serious, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
(OIES), Oxford. 
 
Sweeting, A., 2005, Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 
1995-2000, Working Paper. 
 
Taistra, G., 1999, Die Porter-Hypothese zur Umweltpolitik, Wiesbaden.  
TenneT, 2005, Rapport Monitoring Leveringszekerheid 2004-2012, Arnhem, April. 
Tilley, B. and T. Weyman-Jones, 1999, Productivity Growth and Efficiency Change in 
Electricity Distribution, Working Paper. 
 
UCTE, 2005, System Adequacy Retrospect 2004. 
 
Uyterlinde, M.A., G. H. Martinus, E. van Thuijl, N. Kouvaritakis, L. Mantzos, V. Panos, M. 
Zeka-Paschou, K. Riahi, G. Totsching, I. Keppo, P. Russ, L. Szabo, S. Kypreos, P. Rafaj, C. 
Böhringer, A. Löschel, I. Ellersdorfer, M. Blesl, P. le Mouël, A. S. Kydes, K. Akimoto, F. 
Sano, T. Homma, T. Tomoda, 2004, Energy Trends for Europe in a Global Perspective, 
CASCADE MINTS project, Vol. 1.  
 
Uyterlinde, M. A., G. H. Martinus, H. Rösler, N. Kouvaritakis, V. Panos, L. Mantzos, M. Zeka-
Paschou, S. Kypreos, P. Rafaj, M. Blesl, I. Ellersdorfer, U. Fahl, I. Keppo, K. Riahi, C. 
Böhringer, A. Löschel, F. Sano, K. Akimoto, T. Homma, T. Tomoda, F. Pratlong, P. le Mouël, 
L. Szabo, P. Russ, A. Kydes (2005), The Contribution of Renewable Energy to a Sustainable 
Energy System, CASCADE MINTS project, Vol. 2. 
 
Willems, B., 2006, Virtual Divestitures, Will They Make A Difference? Cournot Competition, 
Option Markets and Efficiency, CSEM WP 150, Berkeley, US. 
 
Williamson, O.E., 1979, Transaction costs economics: The governance of contractual relations, 
Journal of Law and Economics,  vol. 22, pp. 233-260. 
 
Wolak, F., 2001, Designing a Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market That Benefits 
Consumers, working paper, ftp://zia.stanford.edu/pub/papers/hoover.paper.pdf 
 
Wohlgemuth, N., 2000, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in Liberalized European 
Electricity Markets, Eur. Env. 10, 1-11. 